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The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act (CERCLA)' is the primary federal remedial statute
governing hazardous waste contamination sites. In the most publicly
recognizable feature of the statute, the federal government funds
cleanup of hazardous waste sites through the Superfund program.
But, CERCLA also imposes liability for cleanup and associated costs
on parties found responsible for hazardous waste releases.3
The assignment of preexisting CERCILA liability from one party to
another is of the utmost importance for corporations and other busi-
ness entities. This Comment addresses a circuit split that has devel-
oped over the rules governing the successor liability of a corporation
that purchases the assets of another firm that is liable under CERCLA
for hazardous waste contamination. Ultimately, Supreme Court
precedent and general conflict of laws principles require that asset
purchasers be held liable as successors to parties liable under CER-
CLA only if the law of the state containing the hazardous release site
so provides.
Part I of this Comment outlines the general statutory scheme of
CERCLA. As noted above, CERCLA imposes private liability on par-
ties responsible for hazardous waste releases. At the same time, Con-
gress recognized that private responsible parties will not always be
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1 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000).
2 See 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (2000) (authorizing use of funds from the Superfund cre-
ated under 26 U.S.C. § 9507 (2000)).
3 See42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2000) (imposing private CERCLA liability on specified parties).
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identifiable, and thus created the Superfund to pay for federal
cleanup of such sites.
Additionally, Part I demonstrates the economic importance of
successor liability under CERCLA. In total, private parties have paid
nearly $24 billion under CERCLA for remedial activities, which sug-
gests the high stakes a corporation faces if found liable as a successor
to a responsible party.4 Moreover, changes in federal funding for
CERCLA imply that private liability will become even more important
as a funding source for CERCLA cleanups. Special industry taxes de-
signed to replenish the Superfund trust were allowed to expire in
1995, and by 2004 federal funding for CERCLA cleanups was limited
to money appropriated from the general budget.
5
Part II describes successor liability law and its application to CER-
CLA. CERCLA does not explicitly extend liability to the corporate
successors of parties that face existing private liability. However, as a
matter of statutory construction, the courts of appeals that have ad-
dressed the question have unanimously held that CERCLA liability
can extend to successors of responsible parties.6
Given the unanimous conclusion that CERCLA liability can ex-
tend to successors of responsible parties, combined with the absence
of any rules for successor liability within the text of CERCLA, the fed-
eral courts must engage in federal common law rulemaking7 to de-
termine the scope of CERCLA successor liability." As a matter of fed-
4 U.S. EPA, Superfund's 25th Anniversary: Capturing the Past, Charting the Fu-
ture, http://www.epa.gov/superfund/25anniversary (last visitedJan. 20, 2008).
5 JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR & MARK REISCH, LIBRARY OF CONG., SUPERFUND: OVER-
VIEW AND SELECTED ISSUES 11 (2006).
6 See, e.g., United States v. Gen. Battery Corp., 423 F.3d 294, 298 n.3 (3d Cir.
2005).
7 The federal courts may not create general federal common law. Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). However, as a practical matter, the federal courts
create common law rules in a variety of circumstances. Generally, modern federal
common law refers "to federal rules of decision whose content cannot be traced by
traditional methods of interpretation to federal statutory or constitutional commands."
RIcHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 685 (5th ed. 2003). When creating rules of decision through a com-
mon law process, the federal courts may either (1) adopt state law as the federal rule
or (2) judicially create a federal rule.
8 See generally FALLON ET AL., supra note 7, at 693-704 (describing the circum-
stances under which federal common law-making may be appropriate). In the context
of successor liability under CERCLA, the creation of rules of decision by a common
law-like process in the federal courts may be justified as "the normal judicial filling of
statutory interstices." Id. at 693 (quoting HenryJ. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the
New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 421 (1964)).
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eral common law, the courts of appeals have held-in recognition of a
universal rule of corporate law-that asset purchasers are not gener-
ally liable as corporate successors. 9 However, there are four widely
recognized equitable exceptions to this general rule: (1) assumption
of liability, (2) de facto merger, (3) fraud, and (4) mere continua-
tion. 1  Additionally, a minority of states have also recognized two
broader exceptions to asset purchaser nonliability: the product line
and the substantial continuity exceptions."
In fashioning federal common law rules of decision regarding the
applicability under CERCLA of the various exceptions to asset pur-
chaser nonliability, the courts of appeals are split over whether the
adoption of state law or the judicial creation of a federal rule is ap-
propriate.12 In United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc. and its progeny, the
Supreme Court developed a general framework to determine whether
federal courts engaged in federal common law rulemaking (in the
context of statutory gap-filling) should incorporate state law or judi-
cially create a rule "according to their own standards."' 3 According to
9 See Gen. Battery Corp., 423 F.3d at 305 ("The general rule of corporate successor-
ship... is nonliability for acquiring corporations .... "). Note that a corporation that
engages in a statutory merger or consolidation with a responsible party generally as-
sumes successor CERCLA liability.
10 See Lawrence P. Schnapf, CERCLA and the Substantial Continuity Test: A Unifying
Proposal for Imposing CERCLA Liability on Asset Purchasers, 4 ENVTL. LAW. 435, 443-48
(1998) (describing these "traditional" exceptions to asset purchaser nonliability).
1 Id. at 448-54.
12 Compare Gen. Battery Corp., 423 F.3d at 305 (creating a federal rule to determine
CERCLA successor liability), United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832,
837-38 (4th Cir. 1992) (same), and United States v. Mex. Feed & Seed Co., 980 F.2d
478, 487 n.9 (8th Cir. 1992) (same), with United States v. Davis, 261 F.3d 1, 54 (1st Cir.
2001) (holding that state law provides the rules of decision for the federal common
law of CERCLA successor liability), Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94
F.3d 1489, 1501 (11th Cir. 1996) (same), City Mgmt. Corp. v. U.S. Chem. Co., 43 F.3d
244, 250 (6th Cir. 1994) (same), and Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d
1240, 1245 (6th Cir. 1991) (same). See generally New York v. Nat'l Serv. Indus. (Nat'l
Serv. Indus. II), 460 F.3d 201, 207-09 (2d Cir. 2006) (hypothesizing that state law
should apply but noting that no conflict existed for the case at hand); Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Brown & Bryant, Inc., 159 F.3d 358, 363-64 (9th Cir.
1998) (deciding that recent Supreme Court cases favor the application of state law, but
not deciding the issue), N. Shore Gas Co. v. Salomon Inc., 152 F.3d 642, 650-51 (7th
Cir. 1998) (noting a circuit split but reserving the issue). Recently, the Eighth Circuit
has questioned its creation of a federal "substantial continuity" rule in Mexico Feed &
Seed Co. See K.C.1986 Ltd. P'ship v. Reade Mfg., 472 F.3d 1009, 1021-22 (8th Cir. 2007)
(noting that the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51
(1998), may have undermined Mexico Feed & Seed Co., but declining to overrule it).
13 440 U.S. 715, 727 (1979) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Clear-
field Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943)). Even if the Kimbell Foods
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Kimbell Foods, the federal courts should create their own rule if (1) the
federal program "must be uniform in character throughout the Na-
tion," (2) "application of state law would frustrate specific objectives"
of the federal program, and (3) application of a federal rule would
not "disrupt commercial relationships predicated on state law."'
' 4
As Part II makes clear, resolution of the second and third Kimbell
Foods factors requires analysis of the law of the specific state(s) in-
volved in the hazardous waste release.' 5 However, in many cases the
asset purchaser may be incorporated in a state different than the state
in which the hazardous release occurred.16 While few federal courts
have even addressed this issue, those that have disagree over whether
the state of incorporation or the state of the hazardous release site
should provide the applicable exceptions to the general rule of nonli-
ability for asset purchasers."' Similarly, legal commentators have also
failed to identify the appropriate state law. 18
Parts III and IV of this Comment attempt to resolve the conflict of
laws underlying the instant circuit split. Although counterintuitive,
the Kimbell Foods federal-versus-state-law analysis can only be con-
ducted after a court has identified the appropriate state law. Thus,
analysis suggests that a federal court should adopt state law as the rule of decision, the
issue remains one of federal law. See id. at 729 (holding that "when there is little need
for a nationally uniform body of law, state law may be incorporated as the federal rule of
decision" (emphasis added)); see also FALLON ET AL., supra note 7, at 701 (noting that
Kimbell Foods employs a "two-step formulation,"-"federal law governs, but it incorpo-
rates state law").
14 KimbellFoods, 440 U.S. at 728-29 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting, in
part, United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 354 (1966)).
15 See Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 108 (1991) ("[F]ederal
courts should incorporate state law into federal common law unless the particular state
law in question is inconsistent with the policies underlying the federal statute." (em-
phasis omitted)).
16 For example, a Pennsylvania corporation may be responsible for a release of
hazardous wastes in Michigan. See generally Chrysler Corp. v. Ford Motor Co., 972 F.
Supp. 1097, 1103 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
" Compare City Mgmt. Corp., 43 F.3d at 250 (applying the law of the state of incor-
poration), Anspec Co., 922 F.2d at 1248 (same), and United States v. Distler, 865 F.
Supp. 398, 401 (W.D. Ky. 1991) (same), with Chrysler Corp., 972 F. Supp. at 1103 (apply-
ing the law of the state of the hazardous release, rather than the law of the state of in-
corporation of the successor), and United States v. Vt. Am. Corp., 871 F. Supp. 318,
320 (W.D. Mich. 1994) (same).
18 See, e.g., David E. Dopf, Casenote, Federal Common Law or State Law7 : The Ninth Cir-
cuit Takes on Successor Liability Under CERCLA in Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co.
v. Brown & Bryant, Inc., 10 VILL. ENVrL. L.J. 171, 190-96 (1999) (arguing that CERCLA
should incorporate state successor liability law but failing to consider the choice of law
question that arises if the state of incorporation and the state of release differ).
[Vol. 156: 767
SUCCESSOR LIABILITY UNDER CERCLA
Part III answers the preliminary conflict of whether-when the asset
purchaser is a corporation foreign to the state in which the release oc-
curred-the law of the state of incorporation or the state of release
governs. Under general conflict of laws principles, the law of the state
containing the hazardous waste site should generally govern. In most
cases, that state will bear the most significant relationship to, and hold
the most significant interest in, the occurrence at issue.
Finally, applying Kimbell Foods and its progeny, Part IV argues that
the federal common law rules of decision for CERCLA liability of an
asset purchaser should incorporate state law. Neither side in the cur-
rent circuit split has adequately applied these precedents. The cir-
cuits that have judicially created federal rules to govern successor li-
ability under CERCLA have failed to heed Supreme Court doctrine
that requires the presence of a significant conflict between federal
policy and incorporation of state law before a federal court may create
its own rules to fill a statutory gap.' 9 While other circuits have appro-
priately incorporated state successor liability rules into the federal
common law of CERCLA successor liability, these courts have often
failed-as Supreme Court precedent requires-to apply those rules as
they have developed in the particular state at issue.
Turning explicitly to the Kimbell Foods analysis, Part IV demon-
strates that the national uniformity and state law commercial relation-
ship factors provide, at most, ambiguous support for federal courts to
create their own rules of decision in this instance. Moreover, Su-
preme Court cases subsequent to Kimbell Foods have argued that cases
for which the federal courts should create a rule are "'few and re-
stricted,' limited to situations where there is a 'significant conflict be-
tween some federal policy or interest and the use of state law."'
2 0
Thus, the second Kimbell Foods factor-whether application of
state law would frustrate the federal program-assumes primary sig-
nificance. As Part IV demonstrates, there is no clear conflict (to say
nothing of a "significant conflict") between use of state law and the
purposes or operation of CERCLA. Given the absence of strong sup-
port for judicially created federal rules of decision from the other two
Kimbell Foods factors, coupled with the absence of a significant conflict
between federal policy and state law, the law of the state in which the
19 SeeAtherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 218 (1997); O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512
U.S. 79, 87 (1994).
20 O'Melveny & Myers, 512 U.S. at 87 (citation omitted) (quoting Wheeldin v.
Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963) and Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S.
63, 68 (1966)).
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hazardous release occurred should provide the rules of decision for
CERCLA successor liability.
I. CERCLA
CERCLA's structure suggests that Congress intended to balance
stringent private liability for hazardous waste releases with a recogni-
tion that a financially viable responsible party could not always be
found. The resolution of these competing policies has major eco-
nomic consequences for corporations and other business entities en-
gaged in asset purchases.
A. CERCLA Policy
CERCLA combines strict liability for private parties responsible for
hazardous waste releases with public funding for cleanup. Private li-
ability is central to the CERCLA statutory scheme. It creates incen-
tives for the prevention of hazardous waste releases in the first in-
stance. It also creates incentives for private cleanup activities.21
Generally, a private party may face CERCLA liability if "there has
been (1) a release or threatened release; (2) of hazardous substances;
(3) from a facility or vessel; (4) that caused the incurrence of response
costs... ; and (5) the defendant falls within one of the [four classes of
potentially responsible parties (PRPs)]."22 PRPs are (1) current own-
ers and operators of a facility at which hazardous wastes were disposed
of, (2) former owners and operators of such a facility at the time of
disposal, (3) generators of hazardous substances, and (4) transporters
of hazardous substances.23 The courts have generally held that CER-
CLA imposes joint and several liability for hazardous waste contamina-
24tion caused by multiple responsible parties.
As the preceding elements demonstrate, CERCLA imposes strict
liability on all responsible parties. For example, the current owner or
operator of a facility may be liable for cleanup costs under CERCLA
even if that entity did not contribute to the hazardous release. Note,
however, that the statute does limit the classes of private parties that
21 See COUNCIL ON ENvTL. QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 1981, at 99-101
(1981) (describing basic policy elements of CERCLA, including a preference for pri-
vate party cleanup).
22 Schnapf, supra note 10, at 442-43 (footnotes omitted).
23 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2000).
24 RAMSEUR & REISCH, supra note 5, at 8.
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• 25
may be held liable. On the other hand, there is no statutory limit on
26
damages under CERCLA. Indeed, private parties have paid for
about seventy percent of all long-term cleanup costs under CERCLA.
2
The federal government has paid for most of the remaining
cleanup costs. Congress authorized the Hazardous Substances Super-
fund 2 and special industry tax revenues2 to subsidize cleanup pub-
licly. Federal funding has been directed primarily to so-called "or-
phan sites" for which no financially viable PRP can be identified.0
Overall, the federal government has supervised or completed cleanup
work at over one thousand sites across the United States since CER-
CLA's inception in 1980. Indeed, the federal government has raised
32
billions of dollars for remediation of hazardous waste sites.
Thus, through the Superfund, Congress ensured that "the federal
government [could] provide an efficacious response to environmental
hazards" even where no private party was identified as financially li-
able for those hazards.33 Clearly, CERCLA evidences "broad remedial
goals" through its "attempt[] to allocate the financial costs of• ,, 34
cleanup•.. to those actors believed to be responsible. Equally
25 CERCLA itself provides statutory exemptions from liability. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(20) (D) (2000) (providing an exception to liability where a state or local gov-
ernment acquires title to a contaminated facility involuntarily through, for example,
tax delinquency); 42 U.S.C. § 9607(r) (Supp. IV 2004) (creating an exemption for
bona fide prospective purchasers). Additionally, the courts have limited the reach of
private liability under certain circumstances. See, e.g., Robertshaw Controls Co. v. Watts
Regulator Co., 807 F. Supp. 144, 150 (D. Me. 1992) (limiting ownership liability where
a party held title only briefly to facilitate a multiple step transaction).
26 Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Ultimate Independence of the Federal Courts: Defying the
Supreme Court in the Exercise of Federal Common Law Powers, 36 CONN. L. REV. 425, 457
(2004).
27 Christine Todd Whitman, Op-Ed, Keep the Momentum for Superfund Cleanups, N.Y.
TIMESJuly 18, 2002, at A21.
28 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (2000).
See ROGER W. FINDLEY ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
739 (6th ed. 2003) (describing how the Superfund trust, as well as special excise taxes
on industry, pays for cleanup). Note, however, that the current Bush administration
refused to reinstate special industry taxes to replenish the Superfund. See infra text
accompanying notes 37-45.
RAMSEUR & REISCH, supra note 5, at 12.
31 See U.S. EPA, supra note 4.
32 See 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a) (2000) (providing for over $13 billion in funding to the
Superfund); FINDLEY ET AL., supra note 29, at 739 (noting that special industry taxes raised
about $4 million per day for the Superfund until December 1995, when they expired).
33 N. Shore Gas Co. v. Salomon Inc., 152 F.3d 642, 649 (7th Cir. 1998).
M Rosenberg, supra note 26, at 457. Rosenberg notes that many courts have un-
derstood CERCLA's broad remedial goals to provide support for an "extremely broad
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clear, Congress understood that it would not always be possible to
identify the private party responsible for hazardous waste releases, and
thus created public funding mechanisms to clean up these orphan
sites.
B. The Economics of CERCLA Successor Liability
As the preceding discussion suggests, private liability under CER-
CLA constitutes a significant cost to parties held responsible for haz-
ardous waste contamination. Additionally, changes in federal funding
for the program may create incentives for the EPA to attempt to im-
pose private liability on additional parties.
The application of successor liability under CERCLA often means
the difference between no liability and millions of dollars in response
costs to an alleged successor corporation. For example, the average
cost of remedial action at "mega sites" is $140 million. While "mega
sites" are, as their name suggests, the worst case scenario, non-mega
site costs still average in the millions of dollars. 5
6
Additionally, private CERCLA liability-both generally and as ap-
plied to alleged corporate successors-may be increasing in signifi-
cance. Until 1995, special federal taxes (excise taxes on the petro-
leum and chemical industries, as well as a general corporate
environmental income tax) were levied to fund the Superfund trust
that paid for most federal cleanup activities . Congress allowed these
taxes to expire in 1995; by the end of the 2003 fiscal year the trust
38fund was essentially depleted. Since that time, federal spending un-
der CERCLA has been funded almost entirely through general ap-
interpretation of its liability provisions." Id. However, as argued above, CERCLA's
strict liability scheme must be balanced against the fact that Congress provided for
public funding of cleanup where responsible parties were not present.
35 RAMSEUR & REISCH, supra note 5, at 13 n.46.
See id. at 17 (noting that non-mega sites average about $22 million in cleanup
costs in the mining industry and about half as much in other industries).
37 See id. at 11.
38 See id. The termination of the special Superfund taxes may signal a shift in con-
gressional policy. That is, by essentially killing the Superfund, Congress may have in-
tended to shift the cost of cleanup from the industry generally to PRPs. If so, it may be
appropriate for federal courts to interpret and apply CERCLA even more broadly to
allow the government to collect from any party that is arguably a PRP, including suc-
cessor corporations. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 7, at 707 (describing the theory of
"dynamic statutory interpretation," which seeks to "adjust statutes to changed circum-
stances, to the views of the current legislature, or more generally to evolving social un-
derstandings").
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propriations-and these appropriations have been significantly below
projected needs.s9 These funding shortfalls have forced the EPA to
delay remedial work at a number of hazardous waste sites. Addition-
ally, there is some evidence that the EPA has been hesitant to add
mega sites to the National Priorities List4' unless a private responsible
party has been identified.42
Given these budgetary limitations, the EPA may attempt to shift
43response costs to private parties. As noted above, federal funds are
primarily spent at "orphan sites" for which no private responsible
party can be identified. Thus, in order to shift costs to private parties,
the EPA may increasingly seek to identify private parties that can be
held legally responsible through doctrines such as successor liability.
Given these stakes, the EPA, as well as corporations threatened
with CERCLA liability, have significant incentives to litigate successor
liability issues. Unfortunately, transaction costs already constitute be-
tween twenty-eight and forty-six percent of total spending for an aver-
age CERCLA cleanup.44 Resolving the instant circuit split may help
provide the clarity in the law necessary to reduce, or at least to prevent
• • 45
the worsening of, these inefficiencies.
39 See RAMSEUR & REISCH, supra note 5, at 13 fig.3. Ramseur and Reisch estimate
the shortfall to range between almost $600 million in the 2003 fiscal year and $450 mil-
lion in the 2006 fiscal year. See id.
40 Id. at 14.
41 The National Priorities List (NPL) constitutes the official list of the worst sites.
Listing on NPL is a necessary precondition for use of federal Superfund trust dollars
for remedial cleanup at a site. 40 C.F.R. § 300.425(b) (1) (2004).
42 See RAMSEUR & REISCH, supra note 5, at 4 (noting that "Superfund budgetary
issues" affect EPA decisions regarding NPL listing).
43 The Bush administration has justified its refusal to ask Congress to reinstate the
special Superfund taxes by arguing that the "polluter pays" principle suggests that re-
sponsible parties should be identified and made to pay for hazardous waste cleanup.
Id. at 12. Moreover, the EPA can recover attorneys' fees from private responsible par-
ties, which suggests that the EPA may have incentives to try to litigate issues of private
liability. See FINDLEY ET AL., supra note 29, at 739-40 (collecting cases interpreting the
"response costs" authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2000) to include attorneys' fees).
44 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SUPERFUND: LEGAL EXPENSES FOR CLEANUP-
RELATED ACTIVITIES OF MAJOR U.S. CORPORATIONS 6 tbl.1 (1994).
45 This remains true even though this I ultimately argue that CERCLA successor
liability should be governed by application of state law rather than uniform federal
common law, and even though I stress that these state rules are equitable doctrines
that should be applied as fairness requires in specific cases. Resolving the split as ad-
vocated herein at least frames the issue with more certainty than presently available.
Moreover, a significant body of state court decisions exists to help corporate planners
understand the contours of successor liability when structuring specific transactions.
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II. SUCCESSOR LIABILITY UNDER CERCLA
CERCLA imposes private liability on four classes of responsible
parties.4 However, the statute is silent regarding the private liability
of a firm that purchases the assets of, or merges or otherwise com-
bines with, a responsible party. While the federal courts of appeals
that have addressed the issue have unanimously held that CERCLA
may impose private successor liability,47 the circuits have split over the
rules governing the imposition of such liability.
A. Asset Purchasers, the General Rule of Nonliability, and the Exceptions
Traditionally, the structure of a corporate transaction dictates the
extent to which the acquiring corporation assumes the liabilities of
the selling corporation. 4' There are three basic structures for corpo-
rate transactions relevant here.
First, under a statutory merger or consolidation the purchaser as-
sumes by operation of law all the liabilities and obligations of the
seller. 49 Second, the purchaser may acquire the stock of the seller.
Under this scenario, the purchaser owns the seller as a controlling
stockholder, but without a subsequent merger, the purchaser gener-
ally will be liable only for the value of its investment (i.e., the purchase
price).5° Finally, under an asset sale 51 transaction, the purchaser tradi-
46 See supra note 23 and accompanying text (describing the four classes of PRPs).
47 See United States v. Gen. Battery Corp., 423 F.3d 294, 298 n.3 (3d Cir. 2005)
(collecting cases).
48 See generally FRANKLIN A. GEvURTz, BUSINESS PLANNING 1002-05 (3d ed. 2001)
(describing the extent to which a purchaser assumes the liabilities of a seller depend-
ing on the form of corporate transaction at issue).
49 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 259(a) (2001) ("[A]I1 debts, liabilities and du-
ties of the respective constituent corporations shall thenceforth attach to said surviving
or resulting corporation, and may be enforced against it to the same extent as if said
debts, liabilities and duties had been incurred or contracted by it.").
50 GEVURTZ, supra note 48, at 1005.
51 Because asset sales are the primary subject of this Comment, a concrete exam-
ple may be helpful. The following facts are drawn from the transaction at issue in City
Management Corp. v. United States Chemical Co., 43 F.3d 244, 246-50 (6th Cir. 1994).
Corporation A has two shareholders and is engaged in the business of chemical solvent
recycling and disposal. A disposed of the chemicals at a nearby landfill. A also had a
permit to store chemicals on-site. Corporation B is engaged in a similar business but
does not have the permits needed to store wastes at its facility. A's shareholders decide
to sell their business to B. B paid over $700,000 for "all right, title and interest to all of
the tangible and intangible assets which comprise [A's] business" with some named
exceptions. B also expressly assumed all environmental liabilities at A's facility but ex-
pressly disclaimed assumption of other risks. A informed its customers that B would
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tionally bears only those liabilities of the seller that the purchaser
agrees to assume.52 Thus, an asset purchaser is by default not liable
for the debts and obligations of the seller.
Given these characteristics, the asset purchase may provide unique
protection for the purchaser against unforeseen liabilities. This result
is supported by several corporate policy justifications. For example, as
long as the seller receives adequate consideration for its assets, the
seller's creditors will generally be protected even if the purchaser does
not assume liability. However, corporate law also recognizes several
exceptions to the general rule of asset purchaser nonliability.
1. The Traditional Exceptions
Most states recognize a set of four "traditional" exceptions to asset
purchaser nonliability."' A corporation that purchases the assets of
another corporation may face liability for the seller's obligations if (1)
the purchaser makes an express or implied agreement to assume the
obligations, (2) the transaction is effectively a merger or consolidation
of the parties (de facto merger), (3) the purchaser is a continuation
of the selling corporation (mere continuation), or (4) the transaction
is being used fraudulently to avoid liability for the obligations.5 5 Addi-
tionally, inadequate consideration is occasionally considered a fifth
continue the business, and B in fact continued to serve A's former customers. B also
hired all but one of A's nonmanagement employees. But, none of A's officers or
shareholders continued with B. A did not dissolve after the sale, but maintained no
assets other than the proceeds of the sale. Finally, prior to the sale A was informed
that it was potentially liable under CERCLA for its disposal of wastes at the offsite land-
fill. A did not inform B of that potential liability.
52 GEVURTZ, supra note 48, at 1003.
53 See George L. Lenard, Note, Products Liability of Successor Corporations: A Policy
Analysis, 58 IND. L.J. 677, 683 (1983) (describing justifications for the rule of nonliabil-
ity). Lenard also notes that contract principles also support nonliability; the purchaser
should not be bound by an agreement to which it was not a party. Id. at 683-84.
Moreover, asset purchaser nonliability also promotes the alienability and transferability
of corporate assets; Lenard argues that it may thus be analogous to the bona fide pur-
chaser doctrine in real property law. Id. at 684-85.
54 Importantly, even these "traditional" exceptions are not uniformly accepted by
all states. For example, unlike most states, Delaware has refused to put the substance
of a transaction over its form by rejecting the de facto merger doctrine. See Hariton v.
Arco Elecs., Inc., 188 A.2d 123, 125 (Del. 1963) (rejecting the de facto merger excep-
tion to asset purchaser nonliability).
55 MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZA-
TIONS 1075 (9th ed. 2005).
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exception within this group; inadequate consideration may also be
considered an element of the preceding exceptions. 56
Application of these exceptions requires a court to balance the
benefits of adhering to corporate formalities against the potential for
unfair denials of legal relief to creditors and other claimants (e.g., tort
victims). Generally, courts "construe these exceptions strictly because
there is such a strong presumption against holding asset purchasers
liable for the acts of their predecessors."57 On the other hand, these
exceptions are rooted in equity and may be applied as fairness re-
quires.58 Finally, state law with regard to the traditional exceptions
varies across the states. 59 Nonetheless, the outlines of the traditional
exceptions are relatively clear.
The first traditional exception involves the express or implied as-
sumption of liability by the asset purchaser. Importantly, the express
assumption of some of the seller's liabilities does not imply assump-
tion of all those liabilities. Generally, an asset purchaser only impli-
edly assumes an obligation of the seller if the purchaser's conduct or• • 61
representations show an intention to assume that obligation. Thus,
this exception recognizes that it is appropriate to derogate from the
general rule of asset purchaser nonliability where there is evidence
that the parties' bargain (i.e. the purchase price) reflected the alloca-
tion of liability.
The second traditional exception-the "de facto merger"-occurs
where the substance, but not the form, of a transaction is equivalent
56 15 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 7122, at 247-48 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 1999).
57 Schnapf, supra note 10, at 444.
See N. Shore Gas Co. v. Salomon Inc., 152 F.3d 642, 657 (7th Cir. 1998).
59 See Schnapf, supra note 10, at 444-45 (noting the existence of divergent state
standards for the traditional exceptions, especially the de facto merger and mere con-
tinuation exceptions).
60 FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 56, § 7124, at 295-96.
61 Id. at 293-95. Under the facts of the example introduced supra in note 51, cor-
poration B would not be liable as A's successor for the CERCLA liability at the landfill
under an express or implied assumption of liability theory. B assumed only A's envi-
ronmental liabilities at A's facility and expressly disclaimed any others. Moreover,
there is no evidence to suggest that B impliedly intended to assume liability for A's dis-
posal of wastes at the landfill. Cf City Mgmt. Corp. v. U.S. Chem. Co., 43 F.3d 244,
256 (6th Cir. 1994).
62 See Christopher J. Neumann, Successor Liability and CERCLA: The Runaway Doc-
trine of Continuity of Enterprise, 27 ENvrL. L. 1373, 1383-84 (1997) (arguing that the ex-
ception seeks to force firms to internalize the costs of their business activities through
negotiation over price and assumption of liabilities).
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to a statutory merger. In such cases, courts may impose all of the
seller's debts and obligations on the purchaser as occurs under a
statutory merger.6' Generally, a de facto merger may exist if there is
(1) a continuation of the enterprise of the seller corporation, [i.e.,] ...
continuity of management, personnel, physical location, assets and gen-
eral business operations; (2) a continuity of shareholders which results
from the purchasing corporation paying for the acquired assets with
shares of its own stock, this stock ultimately coming to be held by the
shareholders of the seller corporation so that they become a constituent
part of the purchasing corporation; (3) the seller corporation ceases its
ordinary business operation, liquidates and dissolves as soon as legally
and practically possible; and (4) the purchasing corporation assumes
those obligations of the seller ordinarily necessary for the uninterrupted
continuation of normal business operations of the seller corporation.
However, courts sometimes apply the de facto merger exception not-
withstanding the absence of one or more of these factors.
Third, the mere continuation exception applies where the entity
of the purchaser corporation is simply a continuation or "reincarna-
tion" of the seller corporation." "The traditional indications of 'con-
tinuation' are: common officers, directors, and shareholders; and
only one corporation in existence after the completion of the sale of
assets. ' 67 Additionally, courts often consider supplementary factors
"such as continuation of the seller's business practices and policies
and the sufficiency of consideration."6 8 The basic justification for the
63 Importantly, Delaware does not recognize the de facto merger exception. See
infra Part II.A.4.
64 FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 56, § 7124.20. Under the facts of the example in-
troduced supra in note 51, the de facto merger would not strictly apply to make B liable
as A's successor. On the one hand, there is some continuation of enterprise (same as-
sets and employees) and B did assume some of A's obligations (e.g., continued to serve
A's customers). However, there is no continuity of ownership following the cash sale
and A did not dissolve following the sale.
65 FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 56, § 7124.20. Application of the de facto merger
exception notwithstanding the absence of a finding of one of the preceding elements
should not be surprising, given that the doctrine is rooted in equity. That is, provided
that the court applies these elements and finds that fairness requires an imposition of
liability on the purchaser, the absence of a specific element should not be fatal. See,
e.g., N. Shore Gas Co. v. Salomon Inc., 152 F.3d 642, 657 (7th Cir. 1998) (applying the
de facto merger and mere continuation exceptions and arguing that "the equities of
this case ... [are] the crucial and decisive element of our analysis").
FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 56, § 7124.10.
67 Id.
W Id. Under the facts of the example introduced supra in note 51, the mere con-
tinuation exception would not apply to make B a successor to A's CERCLA liabilities.
Most importantly, this exception does not apply because there is no continuation of
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mere continuation exception is that corporate formalities may be dis-
regarded where the purchaser simply constitutes a reorganization of
the seller entered into so as to avoid the seller's creditors. 69
Finally, where an asset purchase constitutes a fraud upon the
creditors of the seller, the purchaser may become liable to the de-
frauded creditors. 70 However, as long as the purchaser pays adequate
consideration in good faith, the asset purchase is not fraudulent.
71
2. The Modern Exceptions
As noted above, the traditional exceptions to asset purchaser
nonliability are relatively narrow. These limits result from a judicial
hesitancy to stray too far from the corporate law principles embodied
in the general rule of nonliability. 72 However, a minority of states as
well as some federal courts have adopted broader exceptions to the
general rule over the past thirty years: the substantial continuity and
products line exceptions.
As commonly formulated, the substantial continuity exception
(also referred to as the continuity of enterprise exception) imposes
successor liability on an asset purchaser if there exists "(1) continuity
of management, personnel, physical location, and assets; (2) dissolu-
tion of the predecessor [seller]; (3) assumption of the ordinary busi-
ness obligations and liabilities by the successor [purchaser]; and (4)
the successor's [purchaser's] presentation of itself as the continuation
of the predecessor [seller] .73
shareholders (no common ownership) and A did not dissolve (both corporations re-
mained after the sale). Cf City Mgmt. Corp. v. U.S. Chem. Co., 43 F.3d 244, 252-53
(6th Cir. 1994).
69 See FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 56, § 7124.10; see also Schnapf, supra note 10, at
448 ("[B]ecause shareholders benefit from the good fortunes of a corporation, they
should not enjoy the profits of an enterprise that has avoided its pretransaction liabili-
ties through corporate formalities.").
70 FLETCHERETAL., supra note 56, § 7125.
71 Id. Again, under the facts of the example introduced suprain note 51, the fraud
exception would not apply to B. There is no evidence that B failed to pay adequate
consideration for A's assets. Cf City Mgmt. Corp., 43 F.3d at 253-55.
72 See George W. Kuney, Jeny Phillips' Product Line Continuity and Successor Cor-
poration Liability: Where Are We Twenty Years Later?, 72 TENN. L. REv. 777, 778 (2005)
(arguing that the traditional exceptions demonstrate a judicial view of "corporate-
supremacy-over-tort-policy").
73 FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 56, § 7123.20; see also Turner v. Bituminous Cas.
Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 883-84 (Mich. 1976) (applying the substantial continuity excep-
tion in the strict products liability context). In a later Michigan case, the fourth ele-
ment was held to be unessential to a finding of substantial continuity between the pur-
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The substantial continuity exception drops the requirement of
shareholder continuity present in both the de facto merger and mereS 74
continuation exceptions. Generally, courts applying the substantial
continuity exception have considered the "totality of the transaction";
thus, the presence or absence of a single factor is not determinative."
The substantial continuity exception is rooted in federal labor
76 77cases and state strict products liability doctrine. The exception
privileges the goals of these substantive legal areas over corporate law
78principles. This exception recognizes that the form of the corporate
79transaction is irrelevant from the standpoint of the injured party.
chaser and seller. See Foster v. Cone-Blanchard Mach. Co., 597 N.W.2d 506, 510 n.6
(Mich. 1999) ("[A] truer reading of Turner suggests that the first three guidelines were
intended to complete the continuity [of] enterprise inquiry where there is a sale of
corporate assets."). Under the facts of the example introduced supra in note 51, B may
be liable as A's successor for A's CERCLA liability. There is continuity of assets and
personnel between A and B. B assumed A's obligations to A's employees and custom-
ers. B held itself out as a continuation of A. On the other hand, A did not dissolve fol-
lowing the sale, so the court would have to decide whether all elements must be pre-
sent to fairly apply the exception to these facts. Cf City Mgmt. Corp., 43 F.3d at 250-51
(noting that the district court applied a modified version of the substantial continuity
test and found no successor liability (for B) because there was no nexus between the
purchaser and the conduct giving rise to CERCLA liability).
74 See Turner, 244 N.W.2d at 880 ("The presence of stock as consideration should
be one factor to use to determine whether there exists a sufficient nexus between the
successor and predecessor corporations to establish successor liability. However, the
absence of an exchange of stock should not not be conclusive."); see also Turner v.
Wean United, Inc., 531 So. 2d 827, 832 (Ala. 1988) ("Although a finding of control by
the same shareholders in both the acquiring company and the selling company is rele-
vant for purposes of... finding a de facto merger, it is not relevant to the question of
continuity of enterprise."); Kuney, supra note 72, at 780-82 (noting that Turner v. Bitu-
minous Casualty Co. explicitly analyzed the substantial continuity exception as a loosen-
ing of the de facto merger exception by requiring only three of the four de facto crite-
ria to assert liability under the substantial continuity category).
75 Schnapf, supra note 10, at 453.
76 See, e.g., Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 182 n.5 (1973) (arguing
that "[tihe perimeters of the labor-law doctrine of successorship... have not been...
narrowly confined" to the traditional exceptions to asset purchaser nonliability).
77 See, e.g., Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 244 N.W.2d at 877-80 (analyzing the
problem of successor liability as one of strict products liability principles and arguing
that products liability requires broader exceptions to asset purchaser nonliability); see
also Cyr v. B. Often & Co., 501 F.2d 1145, 1154 (1st Cir. 1974) (holding that, under
New Hampshire state products liability law, an asset purchaser may be held liable for
the torts of its predecessor).
78 For federal labor law, see Golden State Bottling Co., 414 U.S. at 183 n.5 ("The re-
fusal to adopt a mode of analysis requiring the Board to distinguish among mergers...
and purchases of assets is attributable to the fact that, so long as there is a continuity in
the 'employing industry,' the public policies underlying the doctrine will be served by
its broad application."). For state products liability law, see Kuney, supra note 72, at
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The products line exception goes even further. Generally, the
products line exception may be applicable if (1) the asset purchaser
acquires "substantially all of the [seller's] assets, leaving no more than
a corporate shell remaining"; (2) the purchaser holds "itself out to the
public as a continuation of the" seller, and does so "by producing the
same product line under a similar name"; and (3) the purchaser bene-
fits from the "good will" of the seller."s Additionally, some courts con-
sider whether the purchaser possesses the ability to assume the origi-
nal manufacturer's risk-spreading role.8
As with the substantial continuity exception, the products line ex-
ception privileges the policy goals of strict products liability over cor-S 82
porate law principles. The products line exception is based primar-
ily on three justifications rooted in products liability. First, as noted
above, the asset purchaser may assume the original manufacturer's
risk-spreading role because it possesses "virtually the same ability as
the predecessor to estimate the risks of product liability claims, to in-
sure against them, and to pass on the costs of insurance or damages
777-78 (arguing that the criteria underlying the traditional exceptions "are irrelevant
to... products liability law," and that "successors [should be] liable for the product
defects of their predecessors when they have purchased a seller's business" because
fairness in this context requires the "successor [to take] the bad with the good").
79 See generally Lenard, supra note 53, at 677 ("For corporate planners, the ability to
structure a corporate acquisition as an asset acquisition, thus avoiding liability, is an
obvious benefit of this traditional rule. For products liability plaintiffs, however, the
traditional rule is an undesirable obstacle to the recovery of compensation for their
injuries.").
so FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 56, § 7123.30; see also Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3,
11 (Cal. 1977) (creating a products line exception and holding that "a party which ac-
quires a manufacturing business and continues the output of its line of products...
assumes strict tort liability for defects in units of the same product line previously
manufactured and distributed by [the seller]"); Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., 431 A.2d
811, 825 (N.J. 1981) ("[W]here one corporation acquires all or substantially all the
manufacturing assets of another corporation ... and undertakes essentially the same
manufacturing operation as the selling corporation, the purchasing corporation is
strictly liable for injuries caused by defects in units of the same product line ....").
81 See Ray, 560 P.2d at 8-9. Under the facts of the example introduced supra in
note 51, B would be liable as A's successor for the latter's CERCLA liabilities. B pur-
chased all of A's assets. B benefited from A's goodwill; it continued to serve A's cus-
tomers as a continuation of A. B held itself out as a continuation of A by offering the
same services. A remained only as a corporate shell following the sale.
82 See, e.g., Ramirez, 431 A.2d at 825 ("The social policies underlying strict products
liability.., are best served by extending strict liability to a successor corporation that
acquires.., and continues... the same line of products as its predecessor, particularly
where the successor... benefits from [the predecessor's] name[,] good will, business
reputation and established customers.").
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paid to purchasers of the product.8 3 Second, the asset sale may de-
stroy the plaintiffs remedy against the original manufacturer.8 Fi-
nally, the products line exception "rests upon... the fairness of re-
quiring the successor to assume a responsibility for defective
products" given that the successor enjoys "the original manufacturer's
good will... in the continued operation of the business."
85
Clearly, these considerations stray far from the traditional con-
cerns of corporate law. s6 Moreover, the purchase of the assets of a
single product line may suffice for the imposition of successor liability
under this exception. Thus, the products line exception, even more
than the substantial continuity exception, "creates an enormous po-
tential for liability because an asset purchaser does not have to acquire
an entire business for a court to impose" successor liability.
87
Finally, only a minority of states have adopted these broader ex-
ceptions to the general rule of asset purchaser nonliability. At most,
twelve states have adopted or treated favorably either the substantial
88continuity or products line exceptions. Moreover, those states that
have adopted these exceptions have generally not extended their ap-
plication of strict products liability to cases based on negligence89
83 Lenard, supra note 53, at 679.
84 Ray, 560 P.2d at 9.
85 ld.
86 See supra note 53 and accompanying text (discussing corporate law principles
underlying the general rule of asset purchaser nonliability).
87 Schnapf, supra note 10, at 449. But cf Kuney, supra note 72, at 785 (arguing that
the products line and substantial continuity exceptions are basically identical because
they look to similar elements).
88 See Kuney, supra note 72, at 794 n.129 (collecting cases). Kuney's list appears
overinclusive. For example, he counts Massachusetts as a substantial continuity state
on the basis of Cargill, Inc. v. Beaver Coal & Oil Co., 676 N.E.2d 815 (Mass. 1997). How-
ever, that case explicitly refused to adopt the substantial continuity exception. Id. at
819 n.8. Moreover, other estimates are lower. See, e.g., Alfred R. Light, "Product Line"
and "Continuity of Enterprise" Theories of Corporate Successor Liability Under CERCLA, 11
Miss. C. L. REv. 63, 68-69 (1990) (finding only four states to have adopted the products
line exception). Nonetheless, several important industrial states, such as California,
Michigan, and NewJersey, clearly recognize the broader exceptions to asset purchaser
nonliability. SeeKuney, supra note 72, at 795 n.129.
89 See Kuney, supra note 72, at 790 (noting that California courts have limited Ray to.
strict products liability); Schnapf, supra note 10, at 450 n.72 (noting that several states
have limited application of these exceptions to strict products liability cases in which the
asset sale destroyed the plaintiff's remedy against the original manufacturer).
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3. Delaware Law
A majority of large, publicly held corporations are incorporated
under Delaware law.90 Importantly, these publicly held corporations
generally do business in a large number of states. 1 As the state of in-
corporation for these corporations, Delaware law potentially provides
the governing principles for their successor liability under CERCLA.
9 2
Delaware law does not recognize the modern, broader exceptionsto aset urchser • •93
to asset purchaser nonliability. Moreover, Delaware law does not
recognize the de facto merger theory. 94 Similarly, Delaware courts
have narrowly construed the mere continuation exception. In sum,
Delaware law provides (perhaps uniquely) significant protections for
asset purchasers.
90 See State of Delaware: Division of Corporations, About Agency, http://
www.state.de.us/corp/aboutagency.shtml (last visitedJan. 20, 2008) (noting that over
50% of all publicly traded U.S. companies and 60% of Fortune 500 companies are in-
corporated under Delaware law).
91 EISENBERG, supra note 55, at 107.
92 Under traditional choice of law doctrine, "a corporation's internal affairs are
governed by the law of its state of incorporation-even if the corporation has no busi-
ness contacts with that state." Id. But see infra Part III (arguing that under choice of
law principles the law of the state of hazardous release, and not the law of the state of
incorporation, should generally govern questions of CERCLA successor liability be-
cause that state generally has the most significant relationship to the legal occurrence
at issue).
93 See Elmer v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 698 F. Supp. 535, 540 (D. Del. 1988) (finding
that Delaware law recognizes, at most, only the traditional exceptions).
94 See Hariton v. Arco Elecs., Inc., 188 A.2d 123, 125 (Del. 1963) (rejecting the de
facto merger doctrine). But cf. Sheppard v. A.C. & S. Co., 484 A.2d 521, 524-25 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1984) (noting that the "question of successor liability for torts apparently
has not been directly considered in Delaware" and favorably discussing-but not
adopting-the de facto merger exception).
95 See Elmer, 698 F. Supp. at 542 ("Delaware courts have narrowly construed the
continuation theory. In order to recover under this theory in Delaware, it must appear
that the former corporation is the same legal entity as the latter; that is, 'it must be the
same legal person, having a continued existence under a new name."' (citations omit-
ted) (quoting Fountain v. Colonial Chevrolet Co., No. 86C-JA-117, 1988 WL 40019, at
*9 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 13, 1988))). Delaware law apparently does recognize the ex-
press or implied assumption of liability and fraud exceptions to asset purchaser nonli-
ability. See id. at 54042.
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B. Statutory Silence and the Circuit Split
Notwithstanding the development of successor liability law, Con-
gress failed to specify whether CERCLA liability extends to corporate
96successors.
As noted above, CERC[A imposes liability on all current and for-
mer owners or operators of hazardous waste sites as well as generators
or transporters of hazardous waste. 9' However, CERCLA does not ex-
plicitly answer the question of whether a corporate successor to such a
liable party would face CERCLA liability if the successor did not oth-
erwise fall within the statutory definition of a liable party. For exam-
ple, could a corporation that purchased the assets of another firm be
liable under CERCLA for hazardous waste releases that resulted from
the seller's improper offsite disposal of hazardous waste?
9
8
The federal courts of appeals that have addressed the question
have unanimously held that CERCLA liability may extend to corporate
successors.9 Generally, the courts of appeals have reached this con-
clusion through close analysis of the terms of CERCLA and the gen-
eral rules of statutory construction contained within the United States
Code. 00 CERCLA imposes liability on "persons,"'" which is defined to
include, inter alia, a "firm, corporation, association, partnership, con-
sortium, joint venture [or] commercial entity."0 2  Moreover, these
96 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2000) (imposing CERCLA liability on the enumerated
parties, which do not explicitly include successor firms); see also, e.g., United States v.
Gen. Battery Corp., 423 F.3d 294, 298 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting that CERCLA fails to ex-
plicitly address successor liability).
97 See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
98 That is, under this fact pattern, the seller is liable as the generator of the haz-
ardous waste. But, the purchaser is not the current operator of the facility at which the
release occurred, did not generate the waste, and did not transport the waste. Thus,
the purchaser may only face CERCLA liability under a theory of successor liability.
The question of CERCLA successor liability became even more important after
Congress amended CERCLA to include the prospective purchaser defense. See 42
U.S.C. § 9607(r) (Supp. IV 2004) ("[A] bona fide prospective purchaser whose poten-
tial liability... is based solely on the purchaser's being considered to be an owner or
operator.., shall not be liable as long as [it] does not impede the performance of a
response action."). That is, current owners or operators of a facility are not directly li-
able under CERCLA for contamination caused by past owners if the current owners
meet the requirements of § 9607(r). Nonetheless, the current owner may still be held
liable indirectly as the successor of the past owner.
99 See supra note 6.
100 See, e.g., Gen. Battery Corp., 423 F.3d at 298; Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls,
Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1246-47 (6th Cir. 1991).
101 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2)-(4) (2000).
102 Id. at § 9601(21).
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terms generally "shall be deemed to embrace the words 'successors
and assigns of such [commercial entities].'"0 3
Notwithstanding the unanimity of the courts of appeals with re-
gard to CERCLA's implicit recognition of successor liability, these
courts have split over the appropriate rules to govern such liability.
While the Supreme Court has not addressed this specific question, it
has created a framework to guide federal courts engaged in common
law rulemaking necessary to fill federal statutory gaps. Nonetheless,
the courts of appeals have split on whether the federal common law of
CERCLA successor liability should incorporate state rules or involve
the judicial creation of a federal rule. The Third, 10 4 Fourth,0 5 and
Eighth 1°6 Circuits have adopted or treated favorably judicially created
federal rules to govern the imposition of successor liability under
CERCLA. Conversely, the First,'0 7 Second,' 0 Sixth,'09 and Eleventh"
Circuits have incorporated state law as the rule of decision for CER-
CLA successor liability."'
1. Kimbell Foods
In United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc.12 and its progeny, the Su-
preme Court developed a framework for determining whether the
federal common law rule of decision addressing an issue otherwise
unaddressed by federal statute should be provided by a judicially cre-
ated federal rule"3 or by incorporation of state law. As noted above,
103 1 U.S.C. § 5 (2000).
104 Gen. Battery Corp., 423 F.3d at 303-04.
105 United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832, 837-38 (4th Cir.
1992).
106 United States v. Mex. Feed & Seed Co., 980 F.2d 478, 487 n.9 (8th Cir. 1992).
107 United States v. Davis, 261 F.3d 1, 54 (1st Cir. 2001).
108 New York v. Nat'l Serv. Indus., 460 F.3d 201, 207-09 (2d Cir. 2006).
109 City Mgmt. Corp. v. U.S. Chem. Co., 43 F.3d 244, 250 (6th Cir. 1994).
110 Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1501-02 (11th Cir.
1996).
H The Ninth Circuit earlier used federal common law to govern successor liability
under CERCLA. See Louisiana-Pac. Corp. v. Asarco, Inc., 909 F.2d 1260, 1263 (9th Cir.
1990). More recently, the Ninth Circuit questioned that approach but did not explic-
idy overrule Louisiana-Pacific. See Atchinson, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Brown &
Bryant, Inc., 159 F.3d 358, 364 (9th Cir. 1998) (refusing to overrule Louisiana-Pafic
because the state and federal common law were identical as applied to the facts at is-
sue).
112 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
113 While Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins held that "[t]here is no federal general
common law," 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938), the federal courts may nonetheless create fed-
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CERCLA does not provide rules to govern successor liability for haz-
ardous waste contamination." 4 Thus, Kimbell Foods provides the ap-
propriate framework for determining whether a federal rule or state
law should govern CERCLA successor liability. "
5
Kimbell Foods involved the question of whether liens arising under
two federal loan programs took precedence over private liens on the
same property. No federal statute addressed this question of lien pri-
orities."6  The Supreme Court concluded "that the source of law is
federal" because the loans were made by federal agencies acting un-
der federal statute, "but that a national rule is unnecessary to protect,,.117
the federal interests. Thus, the court adopted "state law as the ap-
propriate federal [common law] rule for establishing the relative pri-
ority of these competing federal and private liens."
11 8
eral common law "to fill the interstices of federal legislation according to their own
standards," Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 727 (quoting Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States,
318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943)). The Kimbell Foods framework explains which factors the
federal courts should consider when deciding whether such gap-filling should be con-
ducted through creation of federal rules of decision or by incorporation of state law.
440 U.S. at 728-29.
114 Kimbell Foods applies where a federal statute is completely silent as to a particu-
lar issue. This situation is analytically distinct from one in which the court engages in
statutory interpretation of an ambiguous provision. See United States v. Gen. Battery
Corp., 423 F.3d 294, 311 n.14 (3d Cir. 2005) (Rendell,J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) (noting that the court was neither "construing a word or phrase in the
statute" nor interpreting "the meaning of a term contained in CERCLA" to determine
the appropriate rules for CERCLA successor liability).
I5 Note, however, that most of the earlier decisions from courts of appeals regard-
ing CERCLA successor liability did not explicitly apply the Kimbell Foods framework. See
Rosenberg, supra note 26, at 468-500 (reviewing the federal appellate courts' failure to
apply Kimbell Foods to CERCLA successor liability). The more recent cases, on the
other hand, have applied Kimbell Foods and its progeny. See, e.g., New York v. Nat'l Serv.
Indus. (Nat'l Serv. Indus. II), 460 F.3d 201, 207-09 (2d Cir. 2006) (applying Kimbell Foods
and finding that state law governs); Gen. Battery Corp., 423 F.3d at 303-04 (applying
Kimbell Foods and finding that federal common law governs).
116 Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 727 (explaining that the "statutes authorizing these
federal lending programs do not specify the appropriate rule of decision" and that
"[f] ederal law therefore controls the Government's priority rights").
117 Id. at 718.
18 Id. Several commentators note that the decision whether to judicially create a
federal rule involves a two-step analysis. First, does the court have the authority or
competence to create a federal rule in the particular context? Second, if the court
does have that authority, should it, as a matter of discretion, exercise that authority?
FALLON ET AL., supra note 7, at 700. Kimbell Foods answered the first question affirma-
tively because the Supreme Court clearly indicated that federal law governed the liens,
but answered the second question in the negative: based on its three-part analysis of
the competing federal and state interests, the Court held that, as a matter of discre-
tion, the creation of a federal rule was not appropriate. Id. at 701.
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Importantly, the Court identified three factors to guide lower fed-
eral courts faced with similar gap-filling situations. First, "federal pro-
grams that 'by their nature are and must be uniform in character
throughout the Nation' necessitate formulation of controlling federal
rules.""" On the other hand, "state law may be incorporated as the
federal rule of decision" where "there is little need for a nationally
uniform body of law."'120 Second, if the "application of state law would
frustrate specific objectives of the federal program[]" at issue, the
courts should "fashion special [federal] rules solicitous of those fed-
eral interests." 2' Third, incorporation of state law is appropriate
where "application of a federal rule would disrupt commercial rela-
tionships predicated on state law."
122
Subsequent Supreme Court cases have refined the Kimbell Foods
analysis. First, when federal courts engage in this analysis, they must
consider "the particular state law in question" rather than general le-
gal principles. 12' That is, the courts must determine if the law of the
particular state at issue conflicts with federal policy.
Second, and equally importantly, subsequent cases have placed the
primary emphasis on the second Kimbell Foods factor, the presence of
conflict between the federal policy at issue and the use of state law as
the rule of decision. In O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, the Supreme Court
argued that cases in which the federal courts should create a federal
common law rule are "'few and restricted,' limited to situations where
there is a 'significant conflict between some federal policy or interest
and the use of state law."' 124 Subsequent Supreme Court cases have re-
affirmed the importance of a "significant conflict" between state law
119 Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728 (quoting United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 354
(1966)).
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 729.
123 Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 108 (1991). For example, in
the CERCLA successor liability context, the analysis should not be whether the rule of
the majority of states is consistent with the federal policies underlying CERCLA. In-
stead, the question is whether the law of the particular state with the most significant
relationship to the hazardous waste release is consistent with CERCLA policy. The
Third Circuit failed to recognize this distinction in United States v. General Battery Corp.;
the court considered general corporate law principles rather than the law of the par-
ticular state at issue. 423 F.3d 294, 300 (3d Cir. 2005); see also FALLON ET AL., supra
note 7, at 704 (noting that federal court adopting state law may be required to analyze
"the choice of which state's law governs").
124 512 U.S. 79, 87 (1994) (citation omitted) (quoting Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373
U.S. 647, 651 (1963) and Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966)).
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and the federal policy at issue. Thus, "such a 'conflict' is normally a
'precondition"' for thejudicial creation of a federal rule.
25
While the significant conflict requirement implies that courts
should generally incorporate state law as the federal common law rule
of decision, the Supreme Court has nonetheless on occasion upheld
the judicial creation of a federal rule. 12 In a case involving a defective
design claim arising out of a military helicopter crash, the Supreme
Court held that a "state law which holds Government contractors li-
able for design defects in military equipment does in some circum-
stances present a 'significant conflict' with federal policy and must be
displaced." 12 7 Such a conflict existed because "uniquely federal" in-
terests, such as the obligations and rights of the federal government
under contracts as well as civil liability for individuals acting on behalf
of the government, would be negatively impacted by the use of state
law. 128 For example, "[tlhe imposition of liability on Government con-
tractors will directly affect the terms of Government contracts." 1
29
Third, the Supreme Court has recently minimized the importance
of the first Kimbell Foods factor, i.e., the need for national uniformity.
The Court noted that uniformity is the "most generic (and lightly in-
voked) of alleged federal interests." 130 Diversity of state law rules may
125 Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 218 (1997) (quoting O'Melveny & Myers, 512
U.S. at 87).
126 Several cases decided before Kimbell Foods held that a federal rule was appropri-
ate. See United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 594-97 (1972) (re-
jecting use of state law as applied to federal government contracts because state law was
"hostile to the interests of the United States"); United States v. 93.970 Acres of Land,
360 U.S. 328, 332 (1959) (creating a federal rule of decision where the application of
state election of remedies law would have imposed a "Hobson's choice" on the federal
government); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366 (1943) ("The
rights and duties of the United States on commercial paper which it issues are gov-
erned by federal rather than local law."). More recently, the Supreme Court upheld
the creation of a federal rule in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504
(1988).
127 Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512.
128 Id. at 505-06. Note that the majority suggested that a lesser conflict mayjustify
the judicial creation of a federal rule where such unique federal interests are present.
See id. at 507-08 ("[T] he fact that the area in question is one of unique federal concern
changes what would otherwise be a conflict that cannot produce pre-emption into one
that can." (emphasis omitted)). The federal government does not have such a unique
interest in human health and land use issues, and thus this lesser conflict standard
does not appear applicable to CERCLA.
129 Id. at 507.
130 O'Melveny & Myers, 512 U.S. at 88.
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not in itself support an inference that a nationally uniform rule is
131necessary.
Thus, as refined by subsequent cases, the Kimbell Foods analysis im-
plies that a federal court should generally incorporate state law as the
federal common law gap-filler in federal statutes. 12 A federal court
should create a federal rule only where the particular state rule sig-
nificantly conflicts with the federal policies at issue.
2. The Impact of Bestfoods on Kimbell Foods
In United States v. Bestfoods, the Supreme Court dealt with CERCLA
liability of corporate parents for the hazardous waste releases of their
subsidiaries. Just as CERCLA is silent on the issue of successor liabil-
ity, the statute fails to create express rules for such parent-corporation
liability. However, Bestfoods did not apply the Kimbell Foods framework.
As discussed below, this omission has caused much confusion in the
lower federal courts.133
Bestfoods involved a cost recovery action by the federal government
against several parties that were potentially responsible for hazardous
131 See Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 219-21 (1997) (arguing that divergent state
law standards of corporate governance do not, in themselves, imply that nationally uni-
form standards are necessary under a federal banking statute).
See FALLON ET AL., supra note 7, at 701 (noting that Kimbell Foods and later cases
suggest "a preference for incorporation of state law").
133 See infra Parts II.B.3 and II.B.4. Another example of lower court difficulties fol-
lowing Bestfoods can be seen in the response of the Second Circuit to that decision. In
B. Goodrich v. Betkoski (Betkoski I), the Second Circuit created a set of federal rules for
CERCLA successor liability that included the substantial continuity exception. 99 F.3d
505, 519 (2d Cir. 1996); see also B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski (Betkoski 11), 112 F.3d 88, 91
(1997) (clarifying that the Kimbell Foods factors supported creation of a federal rule).
After Bestfoods, in New York v. National Services Industries (National Services Industries I),
the Second Circuit overruled Betkoski I, holding that "the substantial continuity doc-
trine is not a part of general federal common law and, following Bestfoods, should not be
used to determine whether a corporation takes on CERCLA liability." 352 F.3d 682,
687 (2d Cir. 2003) (emphasis added). Thus National Services Industries I read Bestfoods
as requiring use of an almost pre-Erie general common law. Further, while National
Services Industries Idid not reconsider Betkoski H's analysis of Kimbell Foods, the court did
argue that Bestfoods potentially supported reversal of Betkoski I. See Nat'l Sems. Indus. I,
352 F.3d at 686 n.1 ("Because we find that... the substantial continuity doctrine can-
not be applied, the analysis prescribed by [Kimbetl Foods] ... would likely come out dif-
ferently now .... In fact, if the state had adopted the substantial continuity test ... then
the state common law might actually facilitate CERCLA's objectives." (citation omit-
ted)). Finally, in New York v. National Service Industries (National Service Industries II),
460 F.3d 201, 207-09 (2d Cir. 2006), the court strongly suggested that Kimbelt Foods re-
quired incorporation of state law for CERCLA successor liability, but reserved the
question as unnecessary to resolution of the case.
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waste contamination cleaned up by the government at a site in Michi-
gan. Two of the PRPs were allegedly liable as "owners or operators"
based on the conduct of their subsidiary corporations at the site. 3 4 The
Sixth Circuit had held that corporate parents could be liable as owners
or operators based on the conduct of their subsidiaries only if the cor-
porate veil of the subsidiary could be pierced under state law. 5 Under
Michigan veil piercing law, the court held that neither parent corpora-
tion was liable under CERCLA.13
6
The Supreme Court vacated the Sixth Circuit's decision. Al-
though the language of the decision was ambiguous, the Court appar-
ently agreed with the Sixth Circuit that a parent corporation could be
held derivatively liable for the conduct of its subsidiary only where the
corporate veil of the subsidiary could be pierced under state 
law.131
However, the Court also held that a parent corporation may be di-
rectly liable as an "operator" under CERCLA under circumstances for
which it would be inappropriate to pierce the corporate veil of the
subsidiary. 18 Thus, the parent corporations at issue could be held di-
rectly liable as CERCLA "operators" of a facility owned by their sub-
134 See Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 56-58.
135 See United States v. Cordova Chem. Co., 113 F.3d 572, 580 (6th Cir. 1997)
("Whether the circumstances in this case warrant piercing of the corporate veil will be
determined by state law." (citing Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240,
1248 (6th Cir. 1991))). The Sixth Circuit rejected the district court's view that CER-
CLA created a new, relaxed standard of parent corporation liability. Cordova Chem. Co.,
113 F.3d at 579.
136 Id. at 581.
137 In a footnote, the Court noted a circuit split "over whether, in enforcing CER-
CLA's indirect liability, courts should borrow state law, or instead apply a federal
common law of veil piercing." Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 63 n.9. The Court refused to de-
cide the issue because no party challenged the lower court holding that neither parent
was indirectly liable. Id. Nonetheless, other language in the opinion suggests that
state law may govern the issue. See id. at 63 ("CERCLA is thus like many another con-
gressional enactment giving no indication that 'the entire corpus of state corporation law
is to be replaced simply because a plaintiff's cause of action is based upon a federal
statute ... ' (emphasis added) (quoting Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 478 (1979)));
id. at 65 ("If any such act of operating a corporate subsidiary's facility is done on behalf
of a parent corporation, the existence of the parent-subsidiary relationship under state
corporate law is simply irrelevant to the issue of direct liability." (emphasis added) (cit-
ing Riverside Mkt. Dev. Corp. v. Int'l Bldg. Products Inc., 931 F.2d 327, 330 (5th Cir.
1991))). But see id. at 61-62 (discussing "hornbook" principles and the "venerable com-
mon law backdrop" of corporate law).
138 See id. at 65 ("The fact that a corporate subsidiary happens to own a polluting
facility operated by its parent does nothing, then, to displace the rule that the parent
'corporation is [itself] responsible for the wrongs committed by its agents in the course
of its business.... .'" (alteration in original) (quoting United Mine Workers of Am. v.
Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 395 (1922))).
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sidiary where, "in degree and detail, actions directed to the facility by
an agent of the parent alone are eccentric under accepted norms of
parental oversight." 139 The district court had failed to make findings
on this issue, and thus the case was remanded) 40
The confusion surrounding Bestfoods does not reflect the preced-
ing legal conclusions, but rather reflects the unclear mode of analysis
employed by the Court. In rejecting indirect parental liability under
CERCLA except where the corporate veil of the subsidiary may be
pierced, the Court refused to decide whether state law or judicially
created federal rules governed the veil-piercing analysis. Indeed,
the Court ambiguously referred both to "state corporation law"-
suggesting that state law governed-and the "venerable common law
backdrop," suggesting that federal judges were free to fashion federal
rules. 141 Similarly, in its discussion of direct CERCLA "operator" liabil-
ity for parent corporations, the Court claimed to engage in straight-
forward statutory construction of the term "operator," 143 but at the
same time referred to general "norms" of corporate law in construing
that term. 144
Thus, Bestfoods involved a very similar issue to Kimbell Foods: con-
gressional silence on an issue necessary to the functioning of a federal
statute. However, Bestfoods did not apply, or even mention, the Kimbell
Foods framework. Indeed, the Court failed to provide any guidance
whatsoever to the lower federal courts. For example, does Bestfoods
imply that CERCLA is different than the federal liens at issue in Kim-
bell Foods, such that the latter does not apply to the CERCLA context?
If Kimbell Foods does apply to CERCLA, how should that analysis be re-
solved?
As an initial matter, nothing in Bestfoods suggests that CERCLA de-
serves special rules of construction.14 Indeed, Bestfoods should be seen
139 Id. at 72.
140 Id. at 72-73.
141 See id. at 63 n.9.
142 See supra note 135.
143 See Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 71.
144 See id. at 71-72.
145 Indeed, the tenor of the opinion is that CERCLA does not displace any legal
rules unless Congress explicitly provided for such a result. See id. at 63-64 ("[T]he fail-
ure of [CERCLA] to speak to a matter as fundamental as the liability implications of
corporate ownership demands application of the rules that '[i] n order to abrogate a
common-law principle, the statute must speak directly to the question addressed by the
common law."' (second alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Texas, 507
U.S. 529, 539 (1993))).
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as an anomalous departure from the post-Kimbell Foods federal com-
mon law doctrine. Most basically, Bestfoods develops no alternative vi-
sion for determining when it is appropriate for the federal judiciary to
create federal common law rules that displace state law. Bestfoods may
suggest that Congress must expressly provide a federal rule if it in-
tends to displace state law-implying that federal statutory gaps
should always be filled with state law.146 However, that reading is fun-
damentally undermined by the Court's repeated reliance on "horn-
book" principles of corporate law. Indeed, Bestfoods made not even a
single reference to Michigan law.
In summary, Bestfoods should be seen as a ticket good for one ride
only. Unless and until the Supreme Court develops an alternative vi-
sion to federal common law-making, Kimbell Foods and its progeny re-
main the only principled basis for determining whether federal com-
mon law should incorporate state law or judicially created federal
rules of decision.
3. Federal Common Law Circuits
As noted above, the Third, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits have ap-
proved the judicial creation of federal rules to fill CERCLA's successor
liability gap. 14 Early decisions by these circuits generally failed to ap-
ply the Kimbell Foods analysis. 48 For example, in United States v. Caro-
lina Transformer Co., the Sixth Circuit simply assumed that Congress
intended for the federal courts to supply a federal rule that would
broadly construe CERCLA's remedial scheme. 149 Similarly, in United
States v. Mexico Feed & Seed Co., the Eighth Circuit simply stated that
"considering the national application of CERCLA and fairness to simi-
larly situated parties, the district court was probably correct in apply-
ing federal law."'1 0 These decisions held that, given the broad reme-
146 See supra note 145.
147 See supra notes 104-106 (collecting cases).
148 See Rosenberg, supra note 26, at 470 (noting that the "federal courts failed to
apply the Kimbell Foods three-part test" to questions of CERCLA successor liability).
"49 See 978 F.2d 832, 837-38 (4th Cir. 1992) ("In adopting a rule of successor liabil-
ity.., we must consider traditional and evolving principles of federal common law,
'which Congress has left to the courts to supply interstitially."' (quoting United States
v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 171 (4th Cir. 1988))).
150 980 F.2d 478, 487 n.9 (8th Cir. 1992).
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dial purposes of CERCLA, the substantial continuity exception to asset
purchaser nonliability was appropriate under federal common law. 151
These cases were decided before O'Melveny & Myers and Ather-
ton.152 More recently, the Third Circuit applied Kimbell Foods and its
progeny to the question of CERCLA successor liability, holding that
federal law provided the applicable rule of decision. 1
3
Importantly, the Third Circuit had previously decided, without
explicitly applying Kimbell Foods, that judicially created federal rules
governed CERCLA successor liability.1 5 4  Thus, the court asked
whether O'Melveny & Myers and Atherton required an overruling of that
earlier case, and held that they did not. '5 However, unlike the courts
in Mexico Feed and Carolina Transformer, the Third Circuit held that
federal law included only those exceptions recognized by a majority of
states-that is, the traditional exceptions. 15
First, in General Battery Corp., the Third Circuit distinguished
O'Melveny & Myers and Atherton because the latter two cases dealt with
federal banking statutes.'57 Thus, those Supreme Court cases did not
explicitly address CERCLA or overrule Smith Land.
Moreover, the panel noted the Supreme Court decision in United
States v. Bestfoods,'58 which addressed the related question of CERCLA
151 See Mex. Feed & Seed Co., 980 F.2d at 488 ("[1] n the CERCLA context, the impo-
sition of successor liability under the 'substantial continuation' test is justified by a
showing that in substance.., the successor is a responsible party. The cases ... have
correctly focused on preventing those responsible for the wastes from evading liability
through the structure of subsequent transactions."); Carolina Transformer, 978 F.2d at
840-41 (holding that, in light of CERCLA's broad remedial goals, the district court ap-
propriately applied the substantial continuity exception to hold defendant liable as a
successor corporation).
152 See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing Kimbell Foods and its progeny). Note, however,
that even after these Supreme Court decisions, the courts of appeals did not consis-
tently analyze CERCLA successor liability under the Kimbell Foods framework. See, e.g.,
B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski (Betkoski I), 99 F.3d 505, 514 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding, with-
out applying Kimbell Foods and its progeny, that federal law governed CERCLA succes-
sor liability and included the substantial continuity exception), abrogated by New York v.
Nat'l Serv. Indus. (Nat7Sero. Indus. 11), 460 F.3d 201, 207 (2d Cir. 2006).
153 United States v. Gen. Battery Corp., 423 F.3d 294, 298-99 (3d Cir. 2005).
154 See Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 92 (3d Cir.
1988) (applying "[t]he general doctrine of successor liability in operation in most
states" through federal common law rulemaking).
155 Gen. Battery Corp., 423 F.3d at 303-04.
156 Id. at 304.
157 Id. at 299-300.
158 524 U.S. 51 (1998). While the Third Circuit's characterization of Bestfoods is
accurate, that case is an outlier in the Supreme Court's federal common law jurispru-
dence. See supra Part II.B.2 (arguing that Bestfoods is inconsistent with Kimbell Foods).
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liability for parent corporations based on the conduct of their subsidi-
aries.' 59 In that case, the Court noted, but declined to resolve as un-
necessary to its decision, a circuit split over whether CERCLA incor-
porated state law for indirect corporate liability.'6 Moreover,
according to the Third Circuit, "Bestfoods applied 'fundamental' and
'hornbook' principles of indirect corporate liability, not the law of any
particular state."16 ' Thus, Bestfoods implicitly supported the use of uni-
form federal rules for CERCLA successor liability rather than incorpo-
ration of state law.16 2 However, those federal rules should include only
"fundamental" principles recognized by a majority of states.1
63
The Third Circuit also argued that the first and third Kimbell Foods
factors supported the use of federal common law based on the law of
the majority of states. First, CERCLA required a nationally uniform
federal rule. In light of state law variation of successor liability rules,
the panel "doubt[ed] [that] Congress intended to incorporate such
variations under a comprehensive federal liability statute." 64 More-
over, "uniform and predictable federal liability standard[s] corre-
spond[] with specific CERCLA objectives by encouraging settlements
and facilitating a more liquid market in corporate and 'brownfield'
assets." 1
65
Additionally, a nationally uniform rule based on "the 'majority'
standard ... accords respect to existing commercial relationships
predicated on the majority state law, while ensuring that responsible
159 See KC.1986 Ltd. P'ship v. Reade Mfg., 472 F.3d 1009, 1021-22 ("We acknowl-
edge that the continuing viability of the substantial continuity theory... as a creation
of federal common law has been seriously questioned following the Supreme Court's
pronouncement in Bestfoods that nothing in CERCLA purports to rewrite the settled
rules of state corporation law .. "). Of course, Bestfoods did not "pronounce" any
such rule at all. See supra Part II.B.2 (noting that Bestfoods is ambiguous as to whether
CERCLA incorporates state law or mandates adoption of federal common law rules).
160 Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 63 n.9.
161 Gen. Battery Corp., 423 F.3d at 300.
162 Id.
163 See id. at 304 (stating that "CERCLA's goal of minimizing litigation and transac-
tion costs is ill-served by a case-by-case approach" that looks to the law of a particular
state).
164 Id. at 302.
165 Id. In support of this argument, the panel cited 42 U.S.C. § 9622(a) (2000),
which encourages settlements "in order to expedite effective remedial actions." The
panel also cited 42 U.S.C. § 9607(r) (Supp. IV 2004), a part of the "Brownfield
Amendments" to CERCLA that encourages redevelopment of potentially contami-
nated property, i.e. brownfields. See Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields
Revitalization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-118, 115 Stat. 2356 (2002) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9622 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004)).
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parties... contribute their fair share to the cleanup of hazardous
waste under the federal program.""" Thus, according to the panel,
the third Kimbell Foods factor also supported judicial creation of a fed-
eral rule.
In summary, several early courts of appeals decisions adopted fed-
eral common law rules in CERCLA successor liability cases. While
these decisions appropriately argued that the modem exceptions to
asset purchaser nonliability may be consistent with CERCLA, 167 they
are fatally flawed insofar as they did not analyze the issue through the
Kimbell Foods framework.
More recently, however, the Third Circuit employed the Kimbell
Foods framework to hold that CERCLA successor liability should be
governed by judicially created federal rules that include only the tradi-
tional exceptions to asset purchaser nonliability. 6s However, the
Third Circuit's analysis was contrary to the Supreme Court decisions
that built on Kimbell Foods.169 The Third Circuit refused to analyze the
law of the particular state at issue, instead placing undue significance
on Bestfoods and the Supreme Court's use of "hornbook" corporate law
principles." v0  That is, even though Bestfoods explicitly reserved the
question of whether state law or judicially created federal rules gov-
erned parent corporation liability under CERCLA, the Third Circuit
inappropriately read the case as mandating the creation of federal
rules of decision on successor liability."' Finally, the Third Circuit
1W Gen. Battery Corp., 423 F.3d at 303 (citations omitted).
167 See infta Parts III.B.1, IV.B (arguing that the modern exceptions are not in con-
flict with CERCLA policies).
168 See Gen. Battery Corp., 423 F.3d at 305 ("CERCLA incorporates, but does not ex-
pand upon, 'fundamental' common law principles of indirect corporate liability.").
169 As a matter of authority, the Third Circuit probably did have the competence
to judicially create a federal rule of decision to govern the federal common law of
CERCLA successor liability. Just as the rights and obligations of the federal govern-
ment in Kimbell Foods arose because of federal law, so too are the rights and obligations
of CERCLA PRPs created by federal law. However, as a matter of discretion, the Kim-
bellFoods analysis suggests that the Third Circuit should not have displaced state succes-
sor liability rules.
170 See Gen. Battery Corp., 423 F.3d at 312 (Rendell,J., dissenting) ("[W]e are not to
evaluate the jurisprudential landscape of all fifty states; rather, 'federal courts should
incorporate state law... unless the particular state law in question is inconsistent with the
policies underlying the federal statute."' (quoting Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc.,
500 U.S. 90, 108 (1991))).
171 More generally, Bestfoods cannot bear the analytic weight thrust upon it by the
General Battery majority. As noted in previously, Bestfoods was an aberrant case in the
Supreme Court's federal common law jurisprudence. See supra Part II.B.2. To read
that case as requiring (1) creation of federal common law rules that (2) contain only
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emphasized national uniformity rather than the presence of a signifi-
cant conflict between CERCLA and use of state law as the rule of deci-
sion for successor liability. 
7 2
4. State Law Circuits
The First, Second, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits have incorporated
state law as the rule of decision for CERCLA successor liability. Addi-
tionally, the Ninth Circuit has questioned, but not explicitly overruled,
an earlier decision that adopted judicially created federal rules. 174
Just as early decisions creating a federal common law rule failed to
analyze CERCLA successor liability under Kimbell Foods, so too did
early decisions incorporating state law omit the Kimbell Foods analy-
sis.175 For example, in Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., the Sixth Cir-
cuit held that CERCLA incorporated state successor liability law as a
matter of statutory interpretation. 1
76
However, recent cases incorporating state successor liability law
into CERCLA have applied Kimbell Foods and its progeny. 177 Generally,
these courts have emphasized arguments pointing to a lack of signifi-
cant conflict between CERCLA and state successor liability rules. 1
78
"traditiofial" or "fundamental" corporate law doctrines is therefore unwarranted-
especially since Bestfoods may have contemplated incorporation of state corporate law.
See supra note 137.
172 Gen. Battery Corp., 423 F.3d at 302.
173 See supra notes 107-110.
174 See supra note 111.
175 See Rosenberg, supra note 26, at 483-91.
176 922 F.2d 1240, 1246-48 (6th Cir. 1991). This result was affirmed without elabo-
ration by a subsequent Sixth Circuit case. See City Mgmt. Corp. v. U.S. Chem. Co., 43
F.3d 244, 250 (6th Cir. 1994) ("In Anspec, we held that a state's law on corporations,
including that state's law on mergers and successor liability, applied in determining
whether a successor corporation would be liable under CERCLA for cleanup costs.").
177 See Rosenberg, supra note 26, at 491-99.
178 See New York v. Nat'l Serv. Indus. (Nat'l Serv. Indus. II), 460 F.3d 201, 208 (2d
Cir. 2006) (noting that the parties pointed "to no conflict between the application of
state law and the federal interests at issue in CERCLA, and we fail to see one"); United
States v. Davis, 261 F.3d 1, 54 (1st Cir. 2001) ("We see no evidence that application of
state law to the facts of this case would frustrate any federal objective."); Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Brown & Bryant, Inc., 159 F.3d 358, 364 (9th Cir. 1998)
("There is no evidence that the application of state corporation law will frustrate
[CERCLA's] objective [of holding responsible parties liable]."); Redwing Carriers, Inc.
v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1502 (11th Cir. 1996) ("[S]tate rules permit
plaintiffs to hold limited partners accountable for a partnership's CERCLA liability
under certain circumstances," and there is no evidence that states will "enact[] more
protective statutes... to defeat CERCLA's goal of having the polluter pay.").
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Absent that type of a significant conflict, these circuits have held that
O'Melveny & Myers and Atherton require incorporation of state law.
Moreover, again consistent with Supreme Court precedent, these
circuits have reduced emphasis on national uniformity. As noted by
the Second Circuit, "[a] lthough CERCLA is a federal statute for which
there is presumably an interest in uniform application,... 'a mere
federal interest in uniformity is insufficient to justify displacing state
law in favor of a federal common law rule.
' '"1 79
However, the decisions that incorporate state successor liability
rules into CERCLA have held that only the traditional exceptions to as-
set purchaser nonliability are applicable--even where the law of the
state at issue recognizes the broader modem exceptions. For example,
City Management Corp. v. U.S. Chemical Co. dealt with an asset purchase
involving two Michigan corporations; the seller was a potentially re-
sponsible party under CERCLA on the basis of its transportation of haz-
ardous solvents to a Michigan landfill.' There was no continuity of
ownership between the seller and purchaser. Thus, the traditional
mere continuation and de facto merger exceptions to asset purchaser
nonliability were not applicable against the purchaser.18 However,
Michigan products liability law recognized the broader substantial con-
tinuity exception.' Nonetheless, the Sixth Circuit concluded-without
analyzing the similarities or differences of the public policies underly-
ing CERCLA and products liability cases-that "it seems clear from the
reasoning... of the [Michigan Supreme Court's] opinion that the ex-
panded Turner exception is limited to products liability cases."'
8 3
In summary, these cases have appropriately applied the Kimbell
Foods analysis-as refined by subsequent Supreme Court decisions-to
hold that, in the absence of a significant conflict between CERCLA
and state successor liability law, CERCLA incorporates those state law
rules. However, the cases have narrowly construed state successor li-
ability law-arguably without sufficient analysis of the underlying poli-
179 Nat'l Ser. Indus. II, 460 F.3d at 208 (quoting B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski (Betkoski
II), 112 F.3d 88, 91 (2d Cir. 1997)); see also Redwing Carriers, 94 F.3d at 1501 ("Adopt-
ing a uniform rule would, perhaps, expedite enforcement of CERCLA by decreasing
uncertainty in assessing liability .... But this argument could be made for adopting a
uniform rule in the context ofjust about any federal statute.").
180 See 43 F.3d at 246-47.
181 Id. at 251-53.
182 See id. at 251 (citing Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 892
(Mich. 1976)); see also infra Part III.B.1 (arguing that the modern exceptions should be
extended from the products liability context to CERCLA cases).
1s3 City Mgmt. Corp. v. U.S. Chem. Co., 43 F.3d 244, 252 (6th Cir. 1994).
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cies of those state rules-so that only the traditional exceptions apply
under CERCLA.
III. CHOICE OF LAW ONE: WHICH STATE LAW?
Asset purchaser liability under CERCLA should be governed by
judicially created federal rules, under Kimbell Foods and its progeny,
only if state law significantly conflicts with the federal policies embod-
ied by CERCLA. 14 Importantly, the decisions incorporating state suc-
cessor liability rules into CERCLA generally have not dwelt long on
the question of the appropriate state law. For example, does the law
of the state of incorporation or the law of the state of hazardous re-
lease govern if they differ? 1 5 Moreover, the federal courts that have
addressed this subsidiary choice of law issue have failed to reach con-
sistent results. 186
This conflict of state law problem (where present) must be re-
solved prior to application of the Kimbell Foods test. 117 As discussed be-
low, the law of the state in which the hazardous waste release occurs
will govern successor liability issues.18
184 See supra Part II.B.1.
185 Indeed, many of the cases do not even specify whether the state of incorpora-
tion differs from the state in which the hazardous release occurred. In part, this may
be because the states of incorporation and release (or at least their laws) were identi-
cal. But, given that a majority of large public corporations are incorporated under
Delaware law but conduct business in other states, see supra Part II.A.3, the state of in-
corporation and release often differ. Additionally, the courts may have failed to ad-
dress this issue because most have assumed that successor liability law is largely uni-
form. See, e.g., Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1249 (6th Cir.
1991) ("[T]he law in the fifty states on corporate dissolution and successor liability is
largely uniform."). However, as Part II.A.2 demonstrates, a substantial minority of
states has adopted nontraditional rules, including several important states (e.g., Cali-
fornia, Delaware, Michigan, New Jersey) that have expanded or contracted the tradi-
tional exceptions to asset purchaser nonliability. So, for example, it may not be un-
common for a corporation to be incorporated under Delaware law-with its narrow
exceptions-while operating in California-with its expanded, modern exceptions.
186 See supra note 17.
187 See Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 108-09 (1991) ("[F]ederal
courts should incorporate state law into federal common law unless the particular state
law in question is inconsistent with the policies underlying the federal statute." (second empha-
sis added)).
188 See infra Part IV.
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A. Which Conflict of Laws Principles?
Before resolving a conflict of substantive state successor liability
rules, a federal court engaged in federal common law rulemaking first
must determine which choice of law principles should apply. '" Again,
the federal courts are split. Some courts follow the approach of
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co.,19  and thus apply the
choice of law rules of the forum state."" Others create federal rules to
govern the choice of law issue. 192
Fortunately, this is one conflict of laws question that normally will
not require an answer, at least for CERCLA successor liability. Most
American jurisdictions use either "traditional" conflict of laws princi-
ples193 or a variant of modern theory that looks to some combination
of the states' relationships to, and their interests in, the legal contro-194
versy. Under either approach, the law of the state in which the haz-
ardous release occurred will govern CERCLA successor liability.
Under traditional conflict of laws principles, torts are governed by
the law of the place in which the injury occurred. 195 CERCLA liability
has been characterized as analogous to tort liability, 196 and thus, under
traditional conflict of laws principles, the law of the state in which the
hazardous waste release occurred will govern. Similarly, as demon-
strated in the next section, the most significant relationship and inter-
est analysis approaches to conflict of laws also suggest that the law of
the state where a hazardous release occurred controls questions of
CERCLA successor liability. Simply stated, the state in which the haz-
189 See FALLON ET AL., supra note 7, at 704 (presenting the alternative approaches
available to federal courts facing questions about which state's law to apply).
190 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
191 FALLON ET AL., supra note 7, at 704 n.10. Klaxon did not involve federal com-
mon law rulemaking, but rather held that a federal court sitting in diversity should ap-
ply the conflict of laws principles of the forum state. See Klaxon Co., 313 U.S. at 496 ("It
is not for the federal courts to thwart ... local policies by enforcing an independent
'general law' of conflict of laws.").
192 FALLONETAL., supra note 7, at 704 n.10 (citing Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1
(1962) as an example in which the choice of law rules from the state of injury governed).
193 See LEA BRILMAYER &JACK GOLDSMITH, CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES AND MATERIALS 1
(5th ed. 2002) (noting that about ten states use the traditional conflict of laws rules).
194 See id. at 278 (noting that twenty-two states have adopted the most significant
relationship approach to conflict of laws); see also DAVID D. SIEGEL, CONFLICTS IN A
NUTSHELL § 79, at 246 (2d. ed. 1994) (arguing that the Second Restatement and inter-
est analysis approaches "involve the same ingredients, and ... ought to reach the same
results").
195 See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 378 (1934).
196 See, e.g., United States v. Hercules, Inc., 247 F.3d 706, 717 (8th Cir. 2001).
[Vol. 156: 767
SUCCESSOR LIABILFITY UNDER CERCLA
ardous release occurs will have a greater connection to and interest in
a CERCLA case than will the state of incorporation.
Thus, unless a federal court intends to develop a novel conflict of
laws approach for CERCLA successor liability issues, the courts will
not face serious difficulty on this point. The dominant approaches to
conflict of laws within the United States all point to the same result.
In light of the ascendancy of the modem approaches to conflict of
laws, the next sections more fully analyze successor liability conflicts
under those approaches.
B. Modem Conflict of Laws Principles
Modem conflict of laws approaches generally consider both the
contacts with, and substantive policies of, the interested states to the
case at issue.'9' Under these approaches, the law of the state in which
the hazardous release occurred should govern.
1. Characterization
CERCLA successor liability for asset purchasers stands at the inter-
section of corporate, tort, and contract law. The manner in which a
court characterizes this issue may have important consequences under
modern conflict of laws principles. In the end, tort conflict of laws
principles should govern CERCLA cases in which the law of the state
of incorporation and hazardous release differ.
If the court characterizes the conflict as one related to corporate
governance, the internal affairs doctrine may govern the conflicts
analysis. Under the internal affairs doctrine, matters of internal cor-
porate governance are generally governed by the law of the state of
incorporation.1 9 8 Moreover, according to the Second Restatement, is-
sues involving rights and liabilities that only corporations may obtain
are generally governed by the law of the state of incorporation."
Successor liability, at least arguably, is unique to corporations (and
197 See SIEGEL, supra note 194, at 246 (arguing that the Second Restatement and
interest analysis approaches "involve the same ingredients, and.., ought to reach the
same results").
198 See EISENBERG, supra note 55, at 107 ("Under traditional choice-of-law rules....
a corporation's internal affairs are governed by the law of its state of incoropora-
tion ....").
199 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 (1971).
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other business organizations) such that the law of the state of incor-
poration should govern.20
However, characterizing CERCLA successor liability as a corporate
law issue (for conflict of laws purposes) is inappropriate. The internal
affairs doctrine focuses primarily on issues related to the allocation of
power and rights within the corporation. Clearly, CERCLA successor
liability deals with very different problems. Notably, the party seeking
recovery against the alleged successor corporation (e.g., the govern-
201ment or another responsible party) is an external actor. Similarly,
while successor liability may be unique to corporations and other
business organizations, CERCLA liability itself is not. 20 ' Finally, even if
the issue was framed in terms of corporate law, the court may none-
theless apply the law of a state other than the state of incorporation if
the "other state has a more significant relationship to the occurrence
and the parties. ' '203 As argued below, the state in which the hazardous
release occurred generally will have a more significant relationship.
Thus, the internal affairs doctrine should not govern conflicts re-
lated to CERCLA successor liability.204 Moreover, tort-rather than
contract-conflict of laws principles should govern successor liability
under the statute. First, CERCLA liability has been characterized as a
205tort in other circumstances. Second, the exceptions to asset pur-
200 See Chrysler Corp. v. Ford Motor Co., 972 F. Supp. 1097, 1102 (E.D. Mich.
1997) ("[I]t could also be argued that [theories of] successor liability.., are theories
of liability peculiar to corporations, in which case § 302 applies.").
201 As the court noted in Chrysler,
A single CERCLA lawsuit may adjudicate the claims of a large number of ac-
tors .... [The parties that] seek to recover from [the alleged successor] did
not organize their relationship under the umbrella of the incorporating
state's law, as would be the case in an internal dispute .... The interests here
go far beyond corporate governance [and] affect a wide range of interests
outside the corporation.
Id. at 1103.
202 See id. at 1102 ("A non-corporate entity may accrue CERCLA liability, and on
that basis § 301 would appear to apply here, leading to the application of normal con-
tract or tort choice of law rules.").
203 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302(2) (1971).
See id. § 301 ("The rights and liabilities of a corporation with respect to a third
person that arise from a corporate act of a sort that can likewise be done by an individ-
ual are determined by the same choice-of-law principles as are applicable to non-
corporate parties.").
205 See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 171-72 (4th Cir. 1988)
(analogizing CERCLA liability in cases involving multiple responsible parties to "indi-
visible harms" resulting from common law torts to support imposition ofjoint and sev-
eral liability on such responsible parties).
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chaser nonliability do not generally relate to the terms of any contrac-
206tual agreement between the buyer and seller. That is, CERCLA suc-
cessor liability actions do not involve claims for breach of contract by
either party; similarly, they generally do not contest the validity or in-
207terpretation of the asset purchase agreement.
Finally, courts dealing with asset purchaser successor liability in
other contexts generally characterize the case, for conflicts purposes,
in terms of the substantive law underlying the claim rather than as a
contract case. For example, in cases involving claims of products li-
ability against an asset purchaser based on the conduct of the seller,
208courts look to tort conflict of laws principles.
2. Modern Approaches to Torts
Under modern conflict of laws doctrine as applied to tort, two
principle approaches have emerged. 2°9 First, under the Second Re-
statement approach adopted by the majority of states,2 l° the state with
206 However, a case involving the expressed or implied assumption of liability the-
ory of successorship may involve contract law issues. See, e.g., Chrysler, 972 F. Supp. at
1104 ("[T]heories based on contractual or quasi-contractual assumption of liability
would seem to invoke the provisions of [Restatement (Second) of Conflict of laws]
§ 188, which specifies factors to be considered in contract actions in the absence of
effective choice of law by the parties.").
207 Cf Federated Rural Elec. Ins. Exch. v. R.D. Moody & Assocs., Inc., 468 F.3d
1322, 1325-26 (11th Cir. 2006) (characterizing a subrogation claim as a tort action,
rather than a contract action, for choice of law purposes because the claim did not
seek to recover for breach of contract or to dispute the "validity, nature, construction,
or interpretation" of any contract).
M See, e.g., Page v. Gulf Oil Co., 812 F.2d 249, 250 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that a
clause in an asset purchase agreement requiring use of California law for contract dis-
putes between asset purchaser and seller did not extend to incorporate California suc-
cessor liability law in products liability actions); Travis v. Harris Corp., 565 F.2d 443,
446 (7th Cir. 1977) (arguing for tort conflict of laws principles in a products liability
case against a successor corporation-even though the asset purchase agreement stipu-
lated use of Ohio law-because products liability raises issue outside the contract);
Hoover v. Recreation Equip. Corp., 792 F. Supp. 1484, 1490-91 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (ap-
plying tort conflict of laws principles to a products liability case against a successor cor-
poration).
These approaches are supplemented by several others, including, most promi-
nently, the "better rule of law" test under which courts, in their view, apply the law of
the state offering the most appropriate substantive legal principles. See, e.g., Milkovich
v. Saari, 203 N.W.2d 408, 417 (Minn. 1973) (applying Minnesota law after concluding
that "we are firmly convinced of the superiority of the [Minnesota] common-law rule
of liability to that of the Ontario guest statute").
210 See BRILMAYER & GOLDSMITH, supra note 193, at 278 ("The Second Restatement
is by far the most popular choice-of-law methodology....").
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the most significant relationship to the occurrence and parties pro-
vides the substantive legal principles. The Second Restatement pro-
vides that several criteria are generally relevant to the choice of law
inquiry:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant
policies of the forum, (c) the relevant policies of the other interested
states and the relative interests of those states ... (d) the protection of
justified expectations, (e) the basic policies underlying the particular
field of law, (f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and (g)
ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.
These criteria suggest that the court is to engage in "policy analysis"
within the conflict of laws inquiry." However, the Restatement also
provides for analysis of the contacts of the states with the legal issue.
Thus, the court is to take into account "(a) the place where the injury
occurred, (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury oc-
curred, (c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation
and place of business of the parties, and (d) the place where the rela-
tionship, if any, between the parties is centered." 213 Finally, the most
214significant relationship analysis applies to each legal issue in a case.
In sum, the Restatement approach is flexible and considers the totality
of the contacts and interests of the conflicting states as applied to each
215legal issue. Other courts engage in interest analysis. Under that
approach, courts look to the underlying policies of the conflicting
state laws at issue and, if a true conflict exists, often apply the law of
the state whose policies would be most impaired by rejection of its
rules. 216
Essentially, the first step in interest analysis is the determination of
whether a true conflict exists. For a true conflict to exist, the states
211 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2) (1971).
212 BRILMAYER & GOLDSMITH, supra note 193, at 263.
213 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971).
214 See SIEGEL, supra note 194, at 239. Thus, a court may apply the law of one state
to legal issue X but the law of another state to legal issue Y, depending on the rela-
tionships of the two states to each issue within the case.
215 See BRILMAYER & GOLDSMITH, supra note 193, at 264 ("Because of the Second
Restatement's eclecticism, courts have done many different things under its banner.
Sometimes they count contacts[;] ... sometimes they perform interest analysis; often
they mix several different approaches.").
216 See Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 546 P.2d 719, 723 (Cal. 1976) ("Once ... a true
conflict of the governmental interests involved as applied to the parties under the par-
ticular circumstances of the case [has been identified], the 'comparative impairment'
approach ... seeks to determine which state's interest would be more impaired if its
policy were subordinated to ... the other state.").
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must have differing rules of law; each must also have an interest favor-
ing the application of its law to the particular case. However, there is
no true conflict where "two competing rules have different instruc-
tions, and literally applied would lead to different results, but...
analysis of the policies underlying the rules shows that one of them
was not aimed at the particular situation despite its facial content.""'
Second, if a true conflict is found, the court often seeks to resolve
the conflict "by applying the law of the state whose interest would be
the more impaired if its law were not applied., 18 This comparative
impairment test does not "'weigh' the conflicting governmental inter-
ests ... [to determine which is] the 'better' or the 'worthier' social
policy."2 9 Instead, "emphasis is placed on the appropriate scope of
conflicting state policies rather than on the 'quality' of those poli-
cies.",220
In summary, the modern approaches to conflict of laws focus on
substantially similar factors-the policies, interests, and overall relation-
ship of the conflicting jurisdictions to the dispute. Indeed, as described
below, both approaches suggest that the law of the state of hazardous
release usually should govern for CERCLA successor liability.
C. Resolution: Law of the State of Hazardous Release
Application of the preceding choice of law principles to a specific
case obviously requires a court to consider the law of the particular
states implicated in the conflict. Nonetheless, the state in which the
hazardous waste release occurs generally will have the most significant
relationship to, and the greatest interest in, the question of CERCLA
successor liability.
As described in Part II.A, the states can be divided into three
classes based on their application of successor liability rules to asset
purchasers: (1) traditional exception states, (2) traditional plus mod-
ern exception states, and (3) Delaware, which does not even recog-
nize all the traditional exceptions. Thus, there are two basic conflict
217 SIEGEL, supra note 194, at 254. In these situations, the court may resolve an
otherwise apparent conflict by reexamining the policy of the states to "determine if a
more restrained interpretation" that avoids the conflict "is more appropriate." Bern-
hard, 546 P.2d at 723.
218 Bernhard, 546 P.2d at 723.
219 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Harold W. Horowitz, The Law
of Choice of Law in California-A Restatement, 21 UCLA L. REV. 719, 753 (1974)).
220 Id. at 724 (alteration in original omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Horowitz, supra note 219, at 753).
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scenarios. First, the successor liability law of the state of incorporation
may recognize fewer exceptions to asset purchaser nonliability than
221does the law of the state of hazardous release. Conversely, the law
of the state of incorporation may recognize more exceptions to asset
222purchaser liability than that of the state of release.
1. False Conflict?
As an initial matter, a conflict between a state recognizing the
modern exceptions and a state limited to the traditional (or Dela-
ware) exceptions may, facially, appear to be a false conflict. The
modern exceptions were developed to address the policies of strict
products liability. Thus, the scope of the modem exceptions, ar-
guably, could be limited to that specific context.224 There would be no
conflict between modern and traditional states in the CERCLA succes-
sor liability context.
However, this "false conflict" analysis should be rejected. Most ba-
sically, the policy considerations that led certain states to adopt the
modern exceptions to asset purchaser liability for strict products liabil-
ity resonate in the CERCLA context.
2 25
221 This would include the following situations: (1) the state of incorporation rec-
ognizes traditional exceptions but the state of release recognizes modern exceptions,
(2) the state of incorporation is Delaware and the state of release recognizes tradi-
tional exceptions, and (3) the state of incorporation is Delaware and the state of re-
lease recognizes modern exceptions.
222 This would include the following situations: (1) the state of incorporation rec-
ognizes traditional exceptions and the state of release is Delaware, (2) the state of in-
corporation recognizes modern exceptions and the state of release is Delaware, and
(3) the state of incorporation recognizes modern exceptions but the state of release
recognizes only traditional exceptions.
221 See supra Part II.A.2 (recognizing that the products liability exception priori-
tizes the policy aims of strict products liability over traditional corporate law concerns).
224 The Sixth Circuit has implicitly accepted this argument. See City Mgmt. Corp.
v. U.S. Chem. Co., 43 F.3d 244, 252-53 (6th Cir. 1994) (rejecting application of Michi-
gan's substantial continuity exception to CERCLA successor liability).
225 See Kenneth K. Kilbert, Successor Liability Under CERCLA: Whither Substantial Con-
tinuity?, 14 PENN. ST. ENvTL. L. REv. 1, 9-10, 20-21 (2005) (arguing that the substantial
continuity exception may be applied under CERCLA); Daniel H. Squire, William P.
Ingram & Don J. Frost, Jr., Corporate Successor Liability Under CERCLA: Who's Next?, 43
Sw. L.J. 887, 906 (1990) (noting that the Department ofJustice argued that the use of
modern exceptions is appropriate under CERCLA based on cost-shifting arguments
similar to risk-spreading in the products liability context). But see Schnapf, supra note
10, at 457 (noting that the existence of the Superfund may mean that "the policy justi-
fications outlined in the product line cases do not apply under CERCLA").
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For example, the California Supreme Court provided three justifi-
cations for adopting the products line exception: (1) the asset pur-
chaser may assume the original manufacturer's risk-spreading role,
(2) the asset sale may destroy the plaintiff's remedy against the origi-
nal manufacturer, and (3) fairness requires that the buyer must take
226the bad consequences of its purchase with the good. These justifi-
cations support imposition of CERCLA liability on asset purchasers.
First, for products liability, risk-spreading justification assumes
that the manufacturer is in the best position to internalize the cost of
227risks. A corporation that purchases the assets of another party that
has caused some harm, whether in a products liability or hazardous
contamination case, should bear the potential associated liability. In
both situations, the asset purchaser has unique incentives to discover,
and minimize the impact of, harm to society caused by the seller. 228 It
is no answer to say that the asset purchaser did nothing wrong; both
CERCLA and strict products liability apply without fault.229 Second, if
the seller dissolves after the asset sale, any CERCLA remedy against
that party may be destroyed.230 Third, the fairness considerations
identified in the products context-most importantly, the fact that the
purchaser benefits from the goodwill of the seller-are equally appli-
cable to CERCLA liability.
226 See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text (identifying three justifications for
the products line exception).
227 See W. Page Keeton, Products Liability-Inadequacy of Information, 48 TEX. L. REV.
398, 408 (1970) (arguing that risks created by the manufacturer "should be a cost of
doing business").
228 Some commentators argue that products liability may be distinguished from
hazardous contamination cases because an asset purchaser cannot generally obtain
insurance against CERCLA liability. Schnapf, supra note 10, at 457-58 (noting that the
insurance policies that serve to limit environmental liability may not be accessible to
successor corporations). However, insurance may be obtained "to minimize the envi-
ronmental liability associated with a transaction and to cover the risks of cost overruns
during site cleanups." Id. at 458 n.124.
22 Indeed, some courts have gone so far as to conclude that, based on the statu-
tory definition of responsible parties, CERCLA does not even require a showing of cau-
sation. See AtL. Richfield Co. v. Blosenski, 847 F. Supp. 1261, 1285 (E.D. Pa. 1994)
("[C]oncern with traditional tort principles of causation is not evident in CERCLA.").
230 A party seeking recovery under CERCLA may be able to collect against a dis-
solved corporation, but such an action is riddled with difficulties. See Schnapf, supra
note 10, at 458 & nn.126-27. On the other hand, the Superfund may provide financing
at sites for which the responsible party cannot be held liable.
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Additionally, as noted in the substantial continuity cases, the form
of the corporate transaction does not matter to the injured party.23' In-
deed, in both products and environmental cases, the state has an inter-
est in protecting its citizens from unjustly bearing the costs of an injury.
In sum, the policies underlying expanded successor liability in
products cases have equal force in environmental harms cases. Thus,
a true conflict does exist between states that recognize the modern
exceptions and those that do not-even in the context of CERCLA.
2. Application of the Law of the State of Release
This true conflict will generally, under modern conflict of laws
principles, be resolved in favor of application of the law of the state in
which the hazardous release occurred rather than the law of the state• 1 232
in which the asset purchaser was incorporated.
The most significant relationship approach first looks to the con-
233tacts between the states and the legal occurrence. This factor will
generally favor the state of release for the following reasons. First, the
injury (the release) occurs in that state, and, generally, the conduct
causing the injury will occur in that state. Second, the injured par-
ties-most especially the public-are located in the state of release.
Finally, the "center" of the relationship between the asset purchaser
and the injured parties is again the state of release. Conversely, the
asset purchaser's only contact with the state of incorporation is via in-
corporation.
Under both the most significant relationship and interest analysis
approaches, the "quality" of these contacts is critically important.
Both approaches involve an inquiry into the relevant policies of the
conflicting jurisdictions to determine the relative degree of impair-
ment of their interests.
First, if the state of incorporation recognizes broader exceptions
to asset purchaser liability than the state of release, then the law of the
latter should control. As noted above in the discussion about false
conflicts, states generally adopt the broader exceptions to protect their
citizens from unjustly bearing the cost of some harm simply because of
231 See supra note 79 (highlighting the divergent interests of corporate planners
and products liability plaintiffs with regards to successor liability).
232 As described below, this holds true regardless of whether the state of hazardous
release recognizes broader or narrower exceptions to successor liability than the state
of incorporation.
233 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145(2) (1971).
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corporate formalities. This interest will not be significantly impaired
if the citizens of another state are forced-by application of a set of nar-
rower exceptions-to bear such costs. Conversely, the state of release
retains an interest in having its narrower successor liability laws consis-
tently applied, even with respect to foreign corporations, to promote
certainty for corporate planners and other business entities operating
within its territory.
Similarly, if the state of incorporation recognizes narrower excep-
tions to asset purchaser liability than the state of release, the law of the
state of release again should control. The state of incorporation has
an important interest in this situation: the promotion of certainty for
businesses incorporating under its law. However, the state of release
also has an important stake in the application of its law. A "single
CERCLA lawsuit may adjudicate the claims of a large number of ac-
tors," including the citizens of the state of release and possibly even
the state itself. Indeed, the comparative impairment test suggests
use of the law of the state of release under these circumstances. The
state of incorporation's policy will be impaired only to the extent that
its domestic corporations operate outside its territory. If its law was
not applied, however, the state of release would lose all control over the
adjudication of its citizens' rights with respect to the allocation of costs
(among the predecessor, successor, and injured parties) arising from
environmental injuries.
Finally, the other factors identified by modern choice of law prin-
ciples generally support the conclusion that the law of the state of re-
lease should govern CERCLA successor liability. A foreign corpora-
tion does not have a justified expectation that the law of its state of
235incorporation will govern its conduct with respect to external actors.
Similarly, while CERCLA actions often will be brought in federal
court, federal courts sitting within the state of release usually will be
236more familiar with that state law. This conclusion also implies cer-
tainty for corporate planners: the law of the state where the assets are
234 Chrysler Corp. v. Ford Motor Co., 972 F. Supp. 1097, 1103 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
235 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2) (d) (listing "the pro-
tection ofjustified expections" as a factor "relevant to the choice of the applicable rule
of law"). The internal affairs doctrine, which requires application of the law of the
state of incorporation, is limited to matters of internal corporate governance. See supra
note 198.
'36 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2) (g) (listing "ease in
the determination and application of the law to be applied" as another relevant factor
in choice of law).
2008]
810 UNIVERSITY OF PENNS YL VANIA LA W REVIEW
237present will govern successor liability issues. Moreover, the basic
policy of the exceptions to successor liability is the recognition that, at
least under certain circumstances, adherence to corporate formalities
may be unjust to injured third parties. This basic policy will be en-
hanced by allowing the state of release to provide the applicable legal
rules in this context; it has the greatest incentive to protect the in-
2381jured parties-its citizens.
In summary, under modern conflict of laws principles, the law of
the state in which the hazardous release occurred should govern
CERCILA successor liability. However, that conclusion does not an-
swer the more basic question of whether CERCLA should incorporate
state law at all.
IV. CHOICE OF LAW TWO: APPLICATION OF KIMBELL FOODS
The state in which the hazardous release occurs should provide
the rules of successor liability if the federal common law of CERCLA
successor liability incorporates state law. Does it? Under Kimbell Foods
and its progeny, the answer must be yes.
While several courts of appeals have reached this conclusion, nei-
ther side of the instant circuit split has adequately addressed the Kim-
bell Foods analysis. The circuits that have created federal rules to gov-
ern CERCLA successor liability have failed to heed Supreme Court
precedents that require the existence of a significant conflict between
239federal policy and incorporation of state law. Conversely, the cir-
cuits that have (appropriately) incorporated state successor liability
law have construed that law too inflexibly. These decisions rarely rec-
ognize the diversity of state law approaches; instead, they incorporate
only the traditional exceptions, ignoring the successor liability princi-
ples actually recognized under state law.
Under Kimbell Foods, the federal courts may create a federal rule if
the following factors are met: (1) the federal program "'must be uni-
237 See id. § 6(2) (f) (listing "certainty, predictability and uniformity of result" as a
relevant choice of law factor). Moreover, if the parties to a transaction dislike these
rules, they may generally bargain for a choice of law provision with the asset sale con-
tract. See id. § 187.
238 See id. § 6(2)(e) (listing "the basic policies underlying the particular field of
law" as a relevant factor).
239 Note that the Supreme Court bears a large measure of responsibility for this
confusion in light of its unexplained failure to apply the Kimbell Foods framework in
United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998). See supra Part II.B.2.
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form in character throughout the Nation,' ' 241 (2) "application of state
law would frustrate specific objectives" of the federal program, 24' and
(3) application of a federal rule would not "disrupt commercial rela-
tionships predicated on state law." 242 Supreme Court cases subsequent
to Kimbell Foods have emphasized the second factor, arguing that the
existence of a significant conflict between federal policy and state law
is a precondition to the creation of federal common law to fill the gap
243
in a federal statute.
A. The "Lesser" Kimbell Foods Factors
Although there are valid arguments on both sides, ultimately nei-
ther considerations of national uniformity nor state law commercial
relationships provide significant support for the creation of federal
successor liability rules under CERCLA.
In Kimbell Foods, the Supreme Court "reject[ed] generalized pleas
for uniformity as substitutes for concrete evidence that adopting state
law would adversely affect administration of federal programs., 244 The
Court noted that the federal agency administering the loan programs
at issue "assumes its security interests are controlled to a large extent
by the commercial law of each State.2 42 Thus, the Court concluded
that "the agencies' own operating practices belie their assertion that a
federal rule... is needed to avoid the administrative burdens created
by disparate state commercial rules.,
246
The instant situation is distinguishable. Most importantly, the
EPA has, since 1984, argued that federal rules should govern CERCLA
247successor liability. Additionally, the EPA has argued that these fed-
eral rules should include the modern, expanded exceptions to asset
240 United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 354 (1966)).
241 Id.
242 Id. at 729.
243 For a full discussion of Kimbell Foods and its progeny, see supra Part II.B.I.
244 440 U.S. at 730.
245 Id.
246 Id. at 732.
247 See Schnapf, supra note 10, at 454 ("In 1984, however, the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency... announced that it would seek to impose liability on successor
corporations."). The Department ofJustice has not only adopted the EPA's position,
but has also argued that the agency's position is entitled to Chevron deference. Id. at
454-55.
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purchaser nonliability. 24 According to the EPA, these expanded ex-
ceptions are consistent with, and would enhance the government's
ability to further, the goals of CERCLA. Thus, unlike the agencies in
Kimbell Foods, the EPA has not assumed that state law would govern
CERCLA liability. Additionally, given the variation in state successor
liability rules, EPA administrative costs would presumably be reduced
through a uniform federal rule.249 Finally, state variation in successor
liability rules suggests that the imposition of CERCLA liability on al-
leged corporate successors will vary by state. Arguably, that result con-
flicts with Congress's intent, embodied in CERCLA strict liability, to
assure that hazardous waste contamination is effectively addressed by
holding responsible parties accountable for cleanup costs across the
country.
Despite these distinctions, there is no pressing need for nationally
uniform successor liability rules under CERCLA. Anticipating the
significant conflict analysis below, state successor liability law variation
does not itself require creation of federal rules unless state law is con-
trary to the federal policy at issue. Moreover, EPA administrative costs
may not be significantly higher if CERCLA incorporates state succes-
sor liability rules; regardless of the content of these rules, the primary
administrative cost (in cases seeking to impose liability on asset pur-
chasers) will result from factual investigations of the relationship be-
tween the CERCLA violator and the alleged successor. Finally, "fears
that states will engage in a 'race to the bottom' in their effort to attract
corporate business [are] groundless" because "[s]tates have a substan-
tial interest in protecting their citizens and state resources."
250
Similarly, state law commercial relationships do not strongly sup-
port the judicial creation of federal rules in this instance. In Kimbell
Foods, the Supreme Court noted that "[i] n structuring financial trans-
actions, businessmen depend on state commercial law tc provide the
stability essential for reliable evaluation of the risks involved. 2 5 ' That
proposition is equally applicable to firms engaged in asset purchases-
248 See U.S. ENVrL. PROT. AGENCY, PRP SEARCH MANUAL 186-87 (2003) (describing
the substantial continuity exception as applicable to CERCLA successor liability).
249 See, e.g., United States v. Gen. Battery Corp., 423 F.3d 294, 301-02 (3d Cir.
2005) (noting the complexity of state successor liability law and arguing that this fact
counsels against incorporation of state law).
250 Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1250 (6th Cir. 1991)
(KennedyJ., concurring). Moreover, if states do engage in a race to the bottom, noth-
ing prevents the courts from reevaluating, in light of these changed circumstances,
their decision to incorporate state law rather than create federal common law.
251 440 U.S. at 739.
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even if the law of the state in which the release occurred, rather than
the state of incorporation, governs.2 2 Corporate planners generally
rely on state commercial law rules when structuring their transactions.
Indeed, "the creation of federal common law in this area will create
uncertainty in future commercial transactions," whereas "[s] tate cor-
porate law ... is well developed and easily discovered and applied."
25
3
In summary, neither the concerns of national uniformity nor the
Kimbell Foods factors involving state law commercial relationships
strongly support creation of federal rules for CERCLA successor liabil-
ity. As described below, the lack of a significant conflict between
CERCLA policy and state successor liability rules also implies that
creation of federal rules is inappropriate here.
B. Significant Conflict? Not Here
Supreme Court cases building on Kimbell Foods have emphasized
the relationship between the federal policy and state law rules. Judi-
cial creation of federal rules to fill statutory gaps is "limited to situa-
tions where there is a 'significant conflict between some federal policy
or interest and the use of state law. "15 Indeed, "such a 'conflict' is
normally a 'precondition"' for creation of a federal rule.2 55
There is no significant conflict between CERCLA policy and use of
state successor liability law. Thus, the courts should incorporate the
law of the state in which the hazardous release occurred to govern
CERCLA successor liability. Importantly, the courts must be sensitive
to variations in state successor liability rules; they should apply the
rules of the state as they find them, rather than simply relying on
"general" principles of corporate law.
As demonstrated in Part III, the state in which the hazardous re-
lease occurred should provide the successor liability rules (if state law
is to govern). Again, the states may be grouped according to the rela-
tive stringency of their exceptions to asset purchaser nonliability.
Delaware law recognizes the fewest exceptions, followed by a majority
of the states that recognize the relatively narrow traditional excep-
tions; a minority of states recognize the modern exceptions and thus
252 See supra Part III.C.2.
253 Anspec Co., 922 F.2d at 1250 (KennedyJ., concurring).
254 O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 87 (1994) (quoting Wallis v. Pan Am.
Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966)).
255 Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 218 (1997) (quoting OMelveny & Myers, 512
U.S. at 87).
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• , • . 256
provide the most flexible successor liability rules. Despite these gra-
dations, the successor liability law of no state significantly conflicts
with federal (CERCLA) policy.
First, consider the states that recognize only the narrower (Dela-
ware or traditional) exceptions. Arguably, if CERCLA successor liabil-
ity is limited to these exceptions, some asset purchasers will escape
CERCLA liability even though-in light of CERCLA strict liability-
those entities have a sufficiently close connection to the (party that
caused the) hazardous release to support liability. 257 The argument is
as follows. A primary purpose of CERCLA is to hold parties responsi-
ble for hazardous waste releases strictly liable for the cleanup cost of• 2581
such contamination. Where the responsible party sells its business
through an asset sale, it may be consistent with CERCLA's strict liabil-
ity scheme to impose liability on the purchaser under some circum-
stances. For example, the de facto and mere continuation exceptions
require continuity of ownership between the seller and purchaser.
However, nothing in CERCLA's strict liability scheme, or the policies
underlying it, suggests that continuity of ownership should be neces-
sary to impose successor liability on the purchaser. But, if the state
recognizes only the narrow exceptions, the asset purchaser may none-
theless escape liability.
This argument is facially appealing because it comports well with
CERCLA's strict liability regime. But Congress placed limits on that strict
2591liability scheme. Indeed, while recognizing that CERCLA imposes
strict liability, an asset purchaser may have only an attenuated relation-
ship to a hazardous waste release.260 Congress has amended CERCLA to
take account of such attenuated relationships, and under appropriate
circumstances, excuse otherwise liable parties from CERCLA.261
256 See supra Part II.A.
257 See Schnapf, supra note 10, at 455 (noting that the Department of Justice sup-
ports expanded liability for asset purchasers because (1) CERCLA seeks to shift costs of
hazardous waste releases from public to industry and (2) expansive liability would cre-
ate incentives for asset purchasers to conduct comprehensive due diligence).
258 See Part I.A.
259 See supra note 25.
260 Cf Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Brown & Bryant, Inc., 159 F.3d 358,
364 (9th Cir. 1998) (arguing that there is no evidence that application of state law will
frustrate CERCLA's objective of holding "responsible" parties liable for hazardous
waste releases).
261 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(r) (Supp. IV 2004) (providing that purchasers of contami-
nated property will not be liable under CERCLA as current owners or operators if such
purchasers satisfy specified conditions).
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More importantly, as Part II demonstrated, Congress recognized
that it would not always be possible to identify the party responsible
for hazardous waste releases. For this reason, Congress created the
Superfund to publicly finance such cleanups. That is, if the applicable
state law fails to impose liability on an asset purchaser (who would,
say, be liable under a modern exception not recognized by the state),
the Superfund would, as a last resort, pay for the cleanup. Thus, state
successor liability rules that recognize only the traditional or Delaware
exceptions do not significantly conflict with the federal policies em-
bodied by CERCLA.
Finally, the traditional exceptions are equitable doctrines. Thus,
courts should apply these exceptions as fairness requires.2 6 2 Indeed,
in the application of even the traditional exceptions to asset purchaser
nonliability, many state courts have argued that the presence or ab-
sence of a single factor in the analysis should not be determinative. 63
Federal courts, when incorporating state successor liability rules into
CERCLA cases, should engage in this type of flexible analysis, at least
when warranted by the doctrine of the particular state and the facts of
the case.
Similarly, it should be even clearer that the use of state law recog-
nizing the expanded modern exceptions to asset purchaser nonliabil-
ity does not significantly conflict with CERCLA policies. The facial
conflict present between CERCLA's strict liability scheme and the tra-
ditional exceptions is absent for the modern exceptions. Indeed, not
even the EPA has sought to impose successor liability on an asset pur-
chaser under a theory more expansive than the modern exceptions.
In summary, use of state successor liability law-whether it recog-
nizes the modern and traditional exceptions or a narrower set of ex-
ceptions-does not significantly conflict with the federal policies em-
bodied by CERCLA. This conclusion follows from the existence of
multiple, sometimes conflicting goals within the statute. 26 Balancing
these goals admits a range of outcomes for successor liability under
262 North Shore Gas Co. v. Salomon Inc., 152 F.3d 642, 657 (7th Cir. 1998)
"[S) uccessor liability is an equitable doctrine that should not apply 'unless justified by
the facts."' (quoting United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832, 837 (4th
Cir. 1992))).
263 See supra note 65 and accompanying text (arguing that absence of specific ele-
ments of a de facto merger should not be fatal).
264 Most importantly, CERCLA contains a strict liability scheme that imposes liability
on private responsible parties but also recognizes that a responsible party cannot always
be identified-and therefore provides for public financing for cleanups of such sites.
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CERCLA. None of the approaches to successor liability taken by the
states significantly conflict with this permissible range. Thus, CERCLA
should incorporate state law. Given the analysis of Part III, the law of
the state in which the hazardous release occurred should govern
CERCLA successor liability.
CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding inconsistent application of the doctrine by both
the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals, Kimbell Foods remains
the only principled framework for determining how the courts should
fill the gaps in federal statutes. This framework suggests-as an in-
creasing number of courts of appeals have recognized-that state law
successor liability rules should be incorporated into the federal com-
mon law of CERCLA successor liability. And again, where the state of
hazardous release and state of incorporation are different and possess
conflicting successor liability rules, the law of the state of release
should govern.
However, the federal courts must apply these state law successor
liability rules as developed by the particular state supplying them. It is
inconsistent with Kimbell Foods for a federal court to claim to incorpo-
rate state law to fill the gaps in a federal statute, and then subse-
quently treat that state law as equivalent to some notion of "funda-
mental" legal principles. Thus, for example, if a state recognizes the
moderm exceptions to asset purchaser nonliability, a federal court in a
CERCLA successor liability case should carefully consider whether the
state policies underlying those exceptions resonate with the goals of
CERCLA. If so, and they usually will, the court should incorporate
those rules into the CERCLA context.
Similarly, even the traditional exceptions to asset purchaser nonli-
ability developed as equitable rules to protect injured third parties from
unjustly bearing the costs of their injury simply because of the form of
a corporate transaction. Given this context, many state courts apply
these exceptions flexibly on a case-by-case basis as fairness warrants.2
65
In light of the commands of Kimbell Foods and its progeny, as well as
the remedial goals of CERCLA, federal courts employing the law of
those states should endeavor to do so as well.
265 See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
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